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φ× φ ⊢ φ,¬φ
Freed from myself, I am the all or the none
In this paper a conditional logic is defined and studied. This conditional logic, Determin-
istic Bayesian Logic, is constructed as a deterministic counterpart to the (probabilistic)
Bayesian conditional. The logic is unrestricted, so that any logical operations are allowed.
This logic is shown to be non-trivial and is not reduced to classical propositions. The
Bayesian conditional of DBL implies a definition of logical independence. Interesting re-
sults are derived about the interactions between the logical independence and the proofs.
A model is constructed for the logic. Completeness results are proved. It is shown that
any unconditioned probability can be extended to the whole logic DBL. The Bayesian
conditional is then recovered from the probabilistic DBL. At last, it is shown why DBL
is compliant with Lewis triviality.
Keywords: Probability, Bayesian inference, Conditional Logic, Sequent, Probabilistic Logic
1. Introduction
Bayesian inference is a powerful principle for modeling and manipulating probabilistic
informations. In many cases, Bayesian inference is considered as an optimal and legitimate
rule for inferring such informations.
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• Bayesian filters for example are typically regarded as optimal filters [ 3],
• Bayesian networks are particularly powerful tools for modeling uncertain informa-
tions. By merging independence priors to the logical priors, Bayesian Networks are
generally associated to Markovian properties, which allow quite efficient computa-
tions [ 21, 19, 8].
Although Bayesian inference is an established principle, it is recalled [ 15] that it has
been disputed until the middle of the XXth century, in particular by the frequencist
community. What made the Bayesian inference established is chiefly a logical justification
of the rule [ 6, 15]. Some convergence with the frequencist interpretation achieved this
acceptation. Cox derived the characteristics of Probability and of Bayesian conditional
from hypothesized axioms about the probabilistic system, which themselves were reduced
in terms of functional equations. Typical axioms are:
• The operation which maps the probability of a proposition to the probability of its
negation is idempotent,
• The probability of A∧B depends only of the probability of A and of the probability
of B given that A is true,
• The probability of a proposition is independent of the way it is deduced (consis-
tency).
It is noticed that Cox interpretation has been criticized recently for some imprecision and
reconsidered [ 10, 14].
In some sense, Cox justification of the Bayesian conditional is not entirely satisfactory,
since it is implicit: it justifies the Bayesian conditional as the operator fulfilling some
natural properties, but does not construct a full underlying logic priorly to the probability.
The purpose of this paper is to construct an explicit logic for the Bayesian conditional as
a conditional logic:
1. Build a (deterministic) conditional logic, priorly to any notion of probability. This
logic will extend the classical propositional logic (unconditioned propositions). It
will contain conditional propositions (ψ|φ) built for any propositions φ and ψ,
2. Being given a probability p over the unconditioned propositions, derive the prob-
abilistic Bayesian conditional from an extension p of p over the whole logic. The
Bayesian conditional will be recovered by setting p(ψ|φ) = p((ψ|φ)) .
Deterministic Bayesian Logic 3
The construction of an explicit underlying logic provides a better understanding of the
Bayesian conditional, but will also make possible the comparison with other rules for
manipulating probabilistic informations, based on other logics [ 9].
It is known that the construction of such underlying logic is heavily constrained by Lewis
triviality [ 18, 13, 24], which has shown some critical issues related to the notion of
conditional probability. In particular, Lewis result implies strong hypotheses about the
nature of the conditionals. Essentially, the conditionals have to be constructed outside
the space of unconditioned propositions. This result implied the way the logic of Bayesian
conditional has been investigated. Many approaches does not distinguish the Bayesian
conditional from probabilistic notions. This is the case of the theory called Bayesian
Logic [ 2], which is an extension of probabilistic logic programming by the way of Bayesian
conditioning. Other approaches like conditional algebra or conditional logic result in the
construction of conditional operators, which finally arise as abstraction independent of any
probability. However, these logical constructions are still approximations of the Bayesian
conditional or are constrained in use.
Since Lewis triviality is a fundamental reference in this work, it is introduced now. By
the way, different logical approaches of the Bayesian conditional are mentioned, and it is
shown how these approaches avoid the triviality.
Lewis triviality.
Let Ω be the set of all events, andM be the set of measurable subsets of Ω. Let Pr(M)
be the set of probability measures on M. Lewis triviality may be expressed as follows:
Let A,B ∈ M with ∅ ( B ( A ( Ω . Then, it is impossible to build a proposition
(B|A) ∈M such that π((B|A)) = π(B|A)
∆
= pi(A∩B)
pi(A)
for any π ∈ Pr(M) .
Lewis triviality thus makes impossible the construction of a (Bayesian) conditional oper-
ator within the same Boolean space.
Proof. Let π be a probability such that 0 < π(B) < π(A) < 1 ; the existence of π is
ensured by hypothesis ∅ ( B ( A ( Ω .
For any propositions C,D ∈M , define πC(D) = π(D|C) =
pi(C∩D)
pi(C)
, when π(C) > 0.
Lewis’ triviality relies on the following calculus, derived when π(A ∩ C) > 0 :
π((B|A)|C) = πC((B|A)) = πC(B|A) =
πC(A ∩ B)
πC(A)
=
pi(C∩A∩B)
pi(C)
pi(A∩C)
pi(C)
=
π(C ∩ A ∩B)
π(A ∩ C)
= π(B|C ∩ A) .
(1)
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Denote ∼ B = Ω \B.
B ⊂ A and 0 < π(B) < π(A) imply π(A ∩ B) > 0 and π(A∩ ∼ B) > 0 .
Then, it is inferred:
π(B)
π(A)
=
π(A ∩B)
π(A)
= π(B|A) = π((B|A)) = π((B|A)|B)π(B) + π((B|A)| ∼ B)π(∼ B)
= π(B|B ∩ A)π(B) + π(B| ∼ B ∩A)π(∼ B) = 1× π(B) + 0× π(∼ B) = π(B) ,
which contradicts the hypotheses 0 < π(B) and π(A) < 1 .
✷✷✷
In fact, the derivation (1) relies on the hypothesis that π((B|A)|C) is defined as πC((B|A)).
This hypothesis is necessary when (B|A) ∈ M , but could be avoided when (B|A) 6∈ M .
More precisely, while the proposition (B|A) is outside M, it becomes necessary to build
for any probability π its extension π over the outside propositions; in particular, it will
be defined π((B|A)) = π(B ∩A)/π(A) for any A,B ∈M . But there is no reason to have
πC(D) = π((D|C)) for D 6∈ M . Thus, the above triviality does not work necessarily.
The property πC 6= π((·|C)) is somewhat counter-intuitive. In particular, it means that
conditionals are not conserved by conditional probabilities. However, it allows the con-
struction of a conditional logic for the Bayesian conditional; our work provides an example
of such construction.
Probabilistic logic and Bayesian logic.
Probabilistic logic, as defined by Nilsson [ 20], has been widely studied in order to model
and manipulate the uncertain information. It tracks back from the seminal work of Boole [
4]. In probabilistic logic, the knowledge, while logically encoded by classical propositions,
is expressed by means of constraints on the probability over these propositions. For
example, the knowledge over the propositions A,B may be described by:
v1 ≤ p(A) ≤ v2 and v3 ≤ p(A→ B) ≤ v4 , (2)
where vi|1 ≤ i ≤ 4 are known bound over the probabilities. Equations like (2) turn
out to be a linear set of constraints over p, while considering the generating propositions
A ∧ B,A ∧ ¬B,¬A ∧ B,¬A ∧ ¬B. It is then possible to characterize all the possible
values for p by means of a linear system. Notice that probabilistic logic by itself does not
manipulate conditional probabilities or any notion of independence. Proposals for extend-
ing the probabilistic logic to conditionals have appeared rather early [ 1], but Andersen
and Hooker [ 2] introduced an efficient modeling and solve of such problems. This new
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paradigm for manipulating Bayesian probabilistic constraints has been called Bayesian
Logic. It is not linear. For example, constraints like p(A∧B) = p(A)p(B) remains essen-
tially a non-linear constraint. Constraints involving both conditional and non-conditional
probabilities also generate non-linearity. In [ 2], Andersen and Hooker expose a method-
ology for solving these non-linear programs. In particular, the structure of the Bayesian
Network is being used in order to reduce the number of non-linear constraints.
Bayesian Logic is a paradigm for solving probabilistic constraint programs, which involve
Bayesian constraints. Since it does not construct the Bayesian conditional as a strict
logical operator, this theory is not concerned by Lewis’ triviality. Bayesian Logic departs
fundamentally from our approach, since Deterministic Bayesian Logic intends to build
the logic underlying the Bayesian conditional priorly to the notion of probability.
Conditional Event algebra.
In Conditional Event Algebra [ 5], the conditional could be seen as an external operator
( | ) , which maps pairs of unconditioned propositions toward an external Boolean space.
There are numerous possible constructions of a CEA. Some typical properties related to
the Bayesian conditional are generally implemented:
• Inference property: (a|b ∧ c) ∧ (b|c) = (a ∧ b|c) ,
• Boolean compatibility: (a ∧ b|c) = (a|c) ∧ (b|c) and (a ∨ b|c) = (a|c) ∨ (b|c) .
But most CEAs provide conditional rules which are richer than the strict Bayesian con-
ditional, and in particular compute the combination of any pairs of conditionals.
The counterpart of such nice properties is the necessity to restrict the conditional to un-
conditioned propositions. The external space hypothesis is thus fundamental here. CEAs
are practically restricted to only one level of conditioning, and usually avoid any inter-
ferences between unconditioned and conditioned propositions. These restrictions are the
way, by which CEAs avoid Lewis’ triviality.
Conditional logics.
Conditional is an ambiguous word, since there may be different meaning owing to the
community. Even the classical inference, φ→ ψ ≡ ¬φ ∨ ψ , is called material conditional
by some. Despite classical inference is systematically used by mathematicians, its dis-
junctive definition makes it improper for some conditions of use. For example, it is known
that it is by essence non-constructive, an issue which tracks back to the foundation of
modern mathematics [ 25].
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Material conditional could be particularly improper for describing the logic of human
mind. For example, consider the sentences:
1. “If Robert were in Berlin, then he would be in France” ,
2. “If Robert were in Berlin, then he would be in Germany” .
Since Germany and France are two distinct countries, a human will say that sentence 1 is
false, while sentence 2 is true. For a human, moreover, the meaning of the sentences are
independent of the fact that Robert is in Berlin or not. Now, interpreting 1 as a material
conditional, it happens that this sentence is true when Robert is not in Berlin. Sentences 1
and 2 should not be actually interpreted as material conditionals. In fact, they are called
Counterfactual conditionals, and their truth does not depend on the truth of their hy-
potheses and conclusions. The philosophers David Lewis and Robert Stalnaker have done
fundamental works on counterfactual conditionals [ 17, 23]. While defining counterfac-
tual conditionals (an example of such conditional, VCU, is detailed in section 3.2), they
based their model constructions on the possible world semantics of modal logic. Beside,
couterfactuals and other related conditionals are deeply connected to the notion of logical
modalities [ 11].
Actually, if we interpret the Bayesian conditional as a probabilistic conditional proposi-
tion, i.e. p(B|A) = p(A > B), it is derived p(A)p(A > B) = p(A∧B) = p(A∧ (A > B)),
which means a probabilistic independence between (A > B) and A. So, it is tempting
to interpret the Bayesian conditional as a counterfactual. Stalnaker claimed that it was
possible to construct such conditional within the universe of events, so as to match the
Bayesian conditional. Lewis answered negatively [ 18] to this conjecture. Nevertheless,
Lewis proposed an alternative interpretation of the probability p(A > B) of the conterfac-
tual A > B, called Imaging [ 16], which give up the strong constraint p(A > B) = p(B|A).
At last, it appears that (counterfactual) conditional logics are, in principle, a nice frame-
work for interpreting the Bayesian inference, but the problem of the triviality have to
be overcome. As already explained in our previous discussion, the triviality should be
avoided by constructing the conditionals outside the classical propositions space and ex-
tending the probability accordingly. Now, existing conditional logics, often inspired from
VCU, fail to implement some natural properties of the Bayesian conditional. This is
particularly true, when considering the negation of propositions. Since the conditional
probability of the negation is obtained as the complement of the conditional probability,
i.e p(∼ B|A) = 1 − p(B|A), it seems natural to hypothesize a similar logical relation,
e.g. (¬ψ|φ) ≡ ¬(ψ|φ); notice that this relation is generally implemented by Conditional
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Event Algebras. This relation is not implemented by conditional logics in general (refer
to the logic VCU defined in section 3.2). In particular, the relation ¬(φ > ψ) ≡ φ > ¬ψ
would contradict the axiom φ > φ (Id) which is widely accepted in the literature; refer to
deduction (17) in section 3.2.
Contribution.
Bayesian logic does not provide a logical interpretation of the Bayesian conditional, but
rather a methodology for solving the program related to a probabilistic Bayesian model-
ing. Existing conditional algebras and conditional logics are restricted or insufficient for
characterizing the Bayesian conditional properly. Our work intends to supply these lim-
itations, by constructing a new conditional logic, denoted Deterministic Bayesian Logic
(DBL), which is in accordance with the Bayesian conditional. The conditional opera-
tor is defined conjointly with a meta-relation of logical independence. The probabilistic
Bayesian inference is recovered from the derived logical theorems and the logical inde-
pendence. This process implies an extension of probability from the unconditioned logic
toward DBL. As a final result, a theorem is proved that guarantees the existence of such
extension (Lewis result is thus avoided).
Section 2 is dedicated to the definition of the Deterministic Bayesian Logic. The lan-
guages, axioms and rules are introduced. In section 3, several theorems of the logic are
derived. A purely logical interpretation of Lewis’ triviality is made, and DBL is compared
with the known conditional logic VCU. A model for DBL is constructed in section 4. A
completeness theorem is derived. The extension of probabilities over DBL is investigated
in section 5. The probabilistic Bayesian inference is recovered from this extension. The
paper is then concluded.
2. Definition of the logic
The Deterministic Bayesian Logic is defined now. This definition implies a notion of
logical independence, which is related to the proof of the propositions. Typically, the
following property holds true for the models of our logic:
Assume φ and ψ to be logically independent.
Then φ ∨ ψ is a tautology implies φ is a tautology or ψ is a tautology .
(3)
In this document, we propose a definition based on the sequent formalism (there is a
previous modal embedded definition [ 7]). However, although the definition is formalized
by means of sequent, it does not retain the rules of sequent calculus [ 12]. For a soft
introduction of the logic, informal intuitions about the Bayesian inference are given now.
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2.1. Logical relations within Bayesian probability
Here, some typical probabilistic relations are considered, and logical theorems and
axioms are extrapolated from these relations. These extrapolations are not justified
here; it is the purpose of the paper to prove the coherence of the whole logic, while this
paragraph is only dedicated to the intuitions behind the formalism.
The logic of a system may be seen as the collection of behaviors which are common
to any instance of this system. Let us consider the example of probability on a finite
(unconditioned) propositional space. For convenience, define P the set of strictly positive
probabilities over this space, that is p ∈ P is such that p(φ) > 0 for any non-empty
proposition φ :
P = {p / p is a probability and ∀φ 6≡ ⊥, p(φ) > 0} .
Then, the following properties are easily derived for unconditioned propositions:
∀p ∈ P, p(φ) + p(ψ) = 1 implies φ ≡ ¬ψ , (4)
∀p ∈ P, p(φ) + p(ψ) ≤ p(η) + p(ζ) implies ⊢ (φ ∨ ψ)→ (η ∨ ζ) , (5)
with corollary:
∀p ∈ P, p(φ) = 1 implies ⊢ φ . (6)
For any p ∈ P, define the conditional extension p by:
p(ψ|φ)p(φ) = p(φ ∧ ψ) , for any unconditioned propositions φ, ψ .
While results (4) to (6) work for unconditioned propositions, we extrapolate them to some
elementary conditional relations related to p:
• It is noticed that ∀p ∈ P, p(ψ|φ)+p(¬ψ|φ) = 1 . Property (4) could be extrapolated
to p(ψ|φ) and p(¬ψ|φ), and then yields:
¬(ψ|φ) ≡ (¬ψ|φ) .
Of course, although intuitively sound, this relation is not justified mathematically.
This logical relation is implemented in DBL as the axiom b4, and is expressed as a
sequent:
⊢ ¬(ψ|φ)↔ (¬ψ|φ) . (7)
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• It is known that ∀p ∈ P, p(ψ|φ)+p(⊥) ≤ p(¬φ∨ψ)+p(⊥) . Then, the extrapolation
of property (5) yields:
⊢ (ψ|φ)→ (φ→ ψ) . (8)
This logical relation is implemented in DBL as the axiom b3.
• Similarly, it comes ∀p ∈ P, p(ψ ∨ η|φ) + p(⊥) ≤ p(ψ|φ) + p(η|φ). Then, the
extrapolation of (5) yields:
⊢ (ψ ∨ η|φ)→ ((ψ|φ) ∨ (η|φ)) .
Together with (7), it is then deduced:
⊢ (ψ → η|φ)→ ((ψ|φ)→ (η|φ)) , (9)
which constitutes a modus ponens for the conditional. This logical relation is im-
plemented in DBL as the axiom b2.
• Another interesting relation is:
⊢ φ→ ψ implies ⊢ ¬φ or ∀p ∈ P, p(ψ|φ) = 1 .
Extrapolating (6), it comes:
⊢ φ→ ψ implies ⊢ ¬φ or ⊢ (ψ|φ) .
This logical relation is implemented in DBL as the axiom b4, and is expressed as a
sequent:
φ→ ψ ⊢ ¬φ, (ψ|φ) . (10)
Notice that in DBL, sequent ⊢ φ, ψ is not equivalent to ⊢ φ∨ψ . In fact, this axiom
is related to the property (3) , mentioned previously.
• From the Bayesian inference, it is known that p(ψ|φ) = p(ψ) implies p(φ|ψ) = p(φ) .
By similar extrapolation, it is then derived:
⊢ (ψ|φ)↔ ψ implies ⊢ (φ|ψ)↔ φ ,
Notice however that this relation does not make sense in general, when φ and ψ are
both unconditioned propositions. This logical relation is implemented in DBL as
the axiom b5, and is expressed as a sequent:
ψ × φ ⊢ φ× ψ , where φ× ψ = (φ|ψ)↔ φ , and ψ × φ = (ψ|φ)↔ ψ . (11)
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In fact, these extrapolated axioms imply constraints, when extending the probabilities
p ∈ P over the conditioned propositions. This paper intends to prove that these constraints
are actually valid, in regard to Lewis’ triviality. It is now time for the logic definition.
2.2. Language
Let Θ = {θi/i ∈ I} be a finite set of atomic propositions.
The language LC of the classical logic related to Θ is the smallest set such that:Θ ⊂ LC¬φ ∈ LC and φ→ ψ ∈ LC for any φ, ψ ∈ LC
The language L of the Deterministic Bayesian Logic related to Θ is the smallest set such
that: Θ ⊂ L¬φ ∈ L , φ→ ψ ∈ L and (ψ|φ) ∈ L for any φ, ψ ∈ L
The following abbreviations are defined:
• φ ∨ ψ = ¬φ→ ψ , φ ∧ ψ = ¬(¬φ ∨ ¬ψ) and φ↔ ψ = (φ→ ψ) ∧ (ψ → φ) ,
• ψ × φ = (ψ|φ)↔ ψ ,
• It is chosen a proposition θ1 ∈ Θ, and it is then denoted ⊤ = θ1 → θ1 and ⊥ = ¬⊤ .
The operator × is involved (subsequently) in the definition of the logical independence,
though it is not sufficient to characterize this meta-relation by itself. ⊤ and⊥ are idealistic
notations for the tautology and the contradiction.
2.3. Sequents
The set of finite sequences of propositions of L, denoted L∗, is defined by:
L∗ =
∞⋃
n=0
Ln , (12)
where Ln is the set of n-uplets of L. In particular, L0 = {∅} where ∅ is the empty
sequence.
Notations.
Subsequently, finite sequences of L∗ are denoted without brackets.
Being given a finite sequence Γ = γ1, . . . , γn of L
∗, then {Γ} = {γ1, . . . , γn} is the set of
all components of the sequence Γ . Notice that the set {Γ} may contain less components
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than the sequence Γ, since a sequence may repeat the same proposition.
Let Γ = γ1, . . . , γn and ∆ = δ1, . . . , δm be two finite sequences of L
∗ . Then Γ,∆ is the
sequence γ1, . . . , γn , δ1, . . . , δm , obtained as a concatenation of Γ and ∆.
Definition.
The set of sequents of L, denoted Seq, is defined as the set of pairs of finite sequences
of L:
Seq = L∗ ×L∗ . (13)
Notation.
Being given a subset X ⊂ Seq of sequents and a sequent (Γ,∆) ∈ Seq, the meta-
relation Γ ⊢X ∆ is defined by:
Γ ⊢X ∆ if and only if (Γ,∆) ∈ X . (14)
When Γ = ∅ (resp. ∆ = ∅), the notation ⊢X ∆ (resp. Γ ⊢X) is used instead of Γ ⊢X ∆.
Subsequently are defined the set of sequents deducible in DBL, denoted B, and the set
of sequents deducible classically, denoted C. These sets are defined by means of rules
and axioms of construction. Such axiomatic constructions depart from common sequent
calculi, like LK.
2.4. Rules and axioms
The sets B ⊂ Seq, B∗ ⊂ Seq and C ⊂ Seq are defined as the smallest subsets of Seq
verifying:
• For X ∈ {B,B∗, C}:
CUT. Γ ⊢X ∆, φ and Λ, φ ⊢X Σ implies Γ,Λ ⊢X ∆,Σ ,
STRUCT. Assume {Γ} ⊂ {Λ} ∪ {⊤} and {∆} ⊂ {Σ} ∪ {⊥} .
Then Γ ⊢X ∆ implies Λ ⊢X Σ .
Modus ponens. φ, φ→ ψ ⊢X ψ ,
Classical Axioms:
c1. ⊢X φ→ (ψ → φ) ,
c2. ⊢X (η → (φ→ ψ))→ ((η → φ)→ (η → ψ)) ,
c3. ⊢X (¬φ→ ¬ψ)→ ((¬φ→ ψ)→ φ) ,
• For X ∈ {B,B∗}:
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b1. φ→ ψ ⊢X ¬φ, (ψ|φ) ,
b2. ⊢X (ψ → η|φ)→ ((ψ|φ)→ (η|φ)) ,
b3. ⊢X (ψ|φ)→ (φ→ ψ) ,
b4. ⊢X ¬(¬ψ|φ)↔ (ψ|φ) ,
• For X = B:
b5. (logical independence is symmetric) : ψ × φ ⊢X φ× ψ ,
• For X = B∗:
b5.weak.A. ψ × ¬φ ⊢X ψ × φ and ψ × φ ⊢X ψ × ¬φ ,
b5.weak.B. ψ ↔ η ⊢X (φ|ψ)↔ (φ|η) .
B is the set of sequents deducible in DBL. C is the set of sequents deducible classically.
The axioms b5.weak.A and b5.weak.B are actually a weakening of b5 (refer to section 3).
The set B∗ is thus related to a weakened version of DBL, denoted DBL∗. In fact, DBL∗ is
a quite useful intermediate for the construction of a model of DBL. It happens that the
model of DBL∗ is constructed directly, while the model of DBL is implied from the model
of DBL∗.
Notations.
The following meta-abbreviations are defined for X ∈ {C,B,B∗} :
• φ ≡X ψ means ⊢X φ↔ ψ.
The relation ≡X is the logical equivalence related to the deduction system X .
In order to alleviate the notations, the subscripts B and B∗ are omitted. In particular, ⊢
(resp. ≡) is used instead of ⊢B or ⊢B∗ (resp. ≡B or ≡B∗).
Notations relative to (·|·).
The set {η ∈ L / ∃ψ ∈ L, η ≡ (ψ|φ)} is called the sub-universe of φ.
The logical independence between propositions is a meta-relation expressed from the
operator × and the sequents:
By definifion, ψ is logically independent of φ , when ⊢ ψ × φ.
The logical independence and the conditional (|) are thus conjointly defined.
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Interpretation.
The construction of the model in section 4 infers the following interpretation of sequent
Γ ⊢ ∆:
If all propositions γ ∈ {Γ} are tautologies of the model,
then there is a proposition δ ∈ {∆} which is a tautology of the model.
(15)
Meaning of the rules and axioms.
Axioms c∗ are well known minimal axioms of classical logic. Axioms b∗ have been
introduced in section 2.1, and are thought to describe the logical behavior of a Bayesian
operator. Axiom modus ponens is the modus ponens rule encoded within a sequent
formalism. Rule CUT is the well known cut rule for merging sequent proofs. Rule
STRUCT is a structural rule for the sequent, which includes the weakening, contraction
and permutation. Moreover, it makes possible to suppress ⊤ (resp. ⊥) from the left (resp.
right) side of a sequent. In particular, STRUCT makes equivalent Γ ⊢ ∆ and Γ,⊤ ⊢ ∆,⊥.
2.5. DBL extends classical logic.
It is noticed that the classical Logic C is obtained by restricting DBL to the language LC
and to the deduction rules CUT and STRUCT, the axiom modus ponens and the classical
axioms c∗ described previously (c.f. appendix A). More precisely, if φ is a theorem of
classical logic, then it is deduced ⊢C φ. So, in some common sense, DBL extends classical
logic. However, the rules of LK (a common sequent calculus for classical logic) do not
work anymore in our system, and moreover, there are sequents deduced from LK which
cannot be derived from our deduction system. Examples are provided in appendix A.
Thus, one have to be careful in the deduction process of classical sequents.
While DBL could be seen as an extension of C, the following properties are desirable:
• If φ ∈ LC , then ⊢ φ implies ⊢C φ ,
• For any probability p defined over LC , there is a probability p over L which extends
p and verifies p(φ ∧ ψ) = p(φ)p(ψ), for any φ, ψ ∈ L such that ⊢ ψ × φ (logical
independence) .
First property just ensures that DBL axioms will not trivialize the classical logic. Second
property ensures that DBL is not just a trivial extension of C, and in particular avoids
the triviality of Lewis. These results are amongst the most contributions of this paper.
Another main contribution of the paper is that such extention p actually implies the
probabilistic Bayesian inference:
p((ψ|φ))p(φ) = p(φ ∧ ψ) , for any φ, ψ ∈ LC .
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These results are obtained from the model constructed for DBL. But first, the following
section studies the logical consequences of the rules and axioms of DBL.
3. Logical theorems and comparison
Subsequently, theorems of DBL are derived. Since both DBL and DBL∗ are studied,
the possibly needed axioms b5∗ are indicated in bracket.
First at all, it happens that both DBL and DBL∗ imply the classical tautologies. In
particular, the following property is proved in appendix A:
Assume that φ is a tautology of classical logic. Then ⊢C φ is deduced from the classical
subsystem of DBL.
For this reason, the theorems of classical logic are assumed without proof from now on,
so that many details in the deductions are implied.
3.1. Theorems
The proofs are done in appendix B. Next theorem is proved here as an example.
3.1.1. The full universe
φ ⊢ ψ × φ . In particular (ψ|⊤) ≡ ψ .
Interpretation: a tautology is independent with any other proposition and its sub-universe
is the whole universe.
Proof. From axiom b3, it comes ⊢ (ψ|φ)→ (φ→ ψ) and ⊢ (¬ψ|φ)→ (φ→ ¬ψ) .
Then ⊢ φ→ ((ψ|φ)→ ψ) and ⊢ φ→ ((¬ψ|φ)→ ¬ψ) , by classical deductions.
Applying b4 (with CUT and classical deductions) yields ⊢ φ→ ((ψ|φ)↔ ψ).
By applying modus ponens and CUT, it follows φ ⊢ (ψ|φ)↔ ψ .
The remaining proof is obvious.
✷✷✷
3.1.2. Axioms order
Axiom b5 implies b5.weak.A.
3.1.3. The empty universe [needs b5.weak.A]
¬φ ⊢ ψ × φ . In particular (ψ|⊥) ≡ ψ .
3.1.4. Left equivalences
ψ ↔ η ⊢ ¬φ, (ψ|φ)↔ (η|φ) .
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Corollary [b5.weak.A]. ψ ↔ η ⊢ (ψ|φ)↔ (η|φ).
Corollary 2 [b5.weak.A]. ψ ≡ η implies (ψ|φ) ≡ (η|φ).
Proof of corollary 2 is immediate from corollary.
3.1.5. Sub-universes are classical [b5.weak.A]
• (¬ψ|φ) ≡ ¬(ψ|φ) ,
• (ψ ∧ η|φ) ≡ (ψ|φ) ∧ (η|φ) ,
• (ψ ∨ η|φ) ≡ (ψ|φ) ∨ (η|φ) ,
• (ψ → η|φ) ≡ (ψ|φ)→ (η|φ) .
3.1.6. Evaluating (⊤|·) and (⊥|·) [b5.weak.A]
ψ ⊢ (ψ|φ) . In particular (⊤|φ) ≡ ⊤ and (⊥|φ) ≡ ⊥ .
3.1.7. Inference property
(ψ|φ) ∧ φ ≡ φ ∧ ψ .
Interpretation: the Bayesian conditional is actually an inference.
3.1.8. Introspection
⊢ ¬φ, (φ|φ) .
Interpretation: a non-empty proposition sees itself as ever true.
Notice that this property is compliant with (⊥|⊥) ≡ ⊥ , itself derived from 3.1.3.
3.1.9. Inter-independence [b5.weak.A]
⊢ (ψ|φ)× φ .
Interpretation: a proposition is independent of its sub-universe.
3.1.10. Independence invariance [b5.weak.A]
ψ × φ ⊢ ¬ψ × φ ,
ψ × φ, η × φ ⊢ (ψ ∧ η)× φ ,
ψ ↔ η, ψ × φ ⊢ η × φ .
3.1.11. Narcissistic independence
φ× φ ⊢ ¬φ, φ .
Interpretation: a propositions independent with itself is either a tautology or a contra-
diction.
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3.1.12. Independence and proof [b5.weak.A]
ψ × φ, φ ∨ ψ ⊢ φ, ψ .
Interpretation: when propositions are independent and their disjunctions are proved, then
at least one proposition is “proved”.
3.1.13. Independence and regularity [b5.weak.A]
φ× η, ψ × η, (φ ∧ η)→ (ψ ∧ η) ⊢ ¬η, φ→ ψ .
Interpretation: unless it is empty, a proposition may be removed from a logical equation,
when it appears in the both sides and is independent with the equation components.
Corollary. ⊢ φ× η , ⊢ ψ × η , ¬η ⊢ and φ ∧ η ≡ ψ ∧ η imply φ ≡ ψ .
Corollary 2. Being given ψ and φ such that ¬φ ⊢, then (ψ|φ) is uniquely defined as the
solution of equation X ∧ φ ≡ ψ ∧ φ (with unknown X) which is independent of φ.
3.1.14. Right equivalences [b5]
ψ ↔ η ⊢ (φ|ψ)↔ (φ|η) (proved with b5 but without b5.weak.B).
Interpretation: equivalence is compliant with the conditioning.
Corollary. Axiom b5 implies b5.weak.B. In particular, DBL∗ is weaker than DBL.
Corollary of b5 or b5.weak.B. ψ ≡ η implies (φ|ψ) ≡ (φ|η).
Combined with the classical theorems and 3.1.4, this last result implies that the equiv-
alence relation ≡ is compliant with the logical operators of DBL/DBL∗. In particular,
replacing a sub-proposition with an equivalent sub-proposition within a theorem still
makes a theorem.
3.1.15. Reduction rule [b5]
Axiom b5 implies (φ|(ψ|φ)) ≡ φ .
3.1.16. Markov Property [b5]
(φt|φt−1)× φ1, . . . , (φt|φt−1)× φt−2 ⊢ ¬
(
t−1∧
τ=1
φτ
)
, (φt|φt−1)↔
(
φt
∣∣∣∣∣
t−1∧
τ=1
φτ
)
.
Interpretation: the Markov property holds, when the conditioning is independent of the
past and the past is possible.
3.1.17. Link between ((η|ψ)|φ) and (η|φ ∧ ψ) [b5]
It is derived: ((η|ψ)|φ) ∧ φ ∧ ψ ≡ (η|ψ) ∧ φ ∧ ψ ≡ φ ∧ ψ ∧ η ≡ (η|φ ∧ ψ) ∧ (φ ∧ ψ) .
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This is a quite limited result and it is tempting to hypothesize the additional axiom
“((η|ψ)|φ) ≡ (η|φ∧ψ) (∗)” . There is a really critical point here, since axiom (∗) implies
actually a logical counterpart to Lewis’ triviality :
Let ((η|ψ)|φ) ≡ (η|φ ∧ ψ) (∗) be assumed as an axiom.
Then ⊢ ¬(φ ∧ ψ), φ↔ ψ, φ× ψ .
Interpretation: if φ and ψ are not exclusive and not equivalent, then they are independent.
This is irrelevant and forbids the use of axiom (∗).
3.2. Comparison with the conditional logic VCU
The axioms of the conditional logic VCU (VCU is an abbreviation for the axioms
system) [ 17] are considered here and compared to DBL. This example is representative
of the difference with some other conditional logics. Theorems derived in section 3.1 are
referred to.
The language of VCU involves a counterfactual inference operator > in addition to the
classical operators. This operator is characterized by the axioms Ax.1 to Ax.6 and the
counterfactual rule CR expressed as follows:
(Ax.1) φ > φ ,
(Ax.2) (¬φ > φ)→ (ψ > φ) ,
(Ax.3) (φ > ¬ψ) ∨ (((φ ∧ ψ) > ξ)↔ (φ > (ψ → ξ))) ,
(Ax.4) (φ > ψ)→ (φ→ ψ) ,
(Ax.5) (φ ∧ ψ)→ (φ > ψ) ,
(Ax.6) (¬φ > φ)→ (¬(¬φ > φ) > (¬φ > φ)) ,
(CR) Being proved (ξ1∧. . .∧ξn)→ ψ , it is proved ((φ > ξ1)∧. . .∧(φ > ξn))→ (φ > ψ) .
It appears that Ax.2, Ax.4, Ax.5, Ax.6 and CR are recovered in DBL. More precisely, Ax.2
becomes ⊢ (φ|¬φ)→ (φ|ψ) (derived from theorems). Ax.4 is exactly b3. Ax.5 is a subcase
of φ ∧ ψ ≡ φ ∧ (ψ|φ) (inference theorem). Ax.6 becomes ⊢ (φ|¬φ) → ((φ|¬φ)|¬(φ|¬φ))
(derived from theorems). And CR is recovered in DBL from the fact that sub-universes
are classical :
⊢ (ξ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ξn)→ ψ implies ⊢ ((ξ1|φ) ∧ . . . ∧ (ξn|φ))→ (ψ|φ) .
Ax.1 has a partial counterpart in DBL, i.e. ⊢ ¬φ, (φ|φ) (theorem). However Ax.3 has no
obvious counterpart in DBL.
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Conversely, b3 is clearly implemented by VCU. It is also noteworthy that Ax.1 and CR,
with n = 1 and ξ1 = φ, infer the rule:
Being proved φ→ ψ, it is proved φ > ψ , (16)
which is stronger than b1. Although b2 is not implemented by VCU, it is easily shown
that VCU completed by b4 implies b2. The fact is that b4 is not implemented by VCU.
Moreover, b5 is related to the notion of logical independence, which is not considered
within VCU.
Then we have to point out three fundamental distinctions of DBL compared to VCU:
1. In DBL, the negation commutes with the conditional (b4). More generally, sub-
universes are classical in DBL,
2. In DBL, the deductions on the conditionals are often weakened by the hypothesis
that the condition is not empty ; for example, ¬φ in rule b1, or theorem ⊢ (φ|φ),¬φ ,
3. DBL manipulates a notion of logical independence of the propositions.
In fact, point 1 (commutation of the negation) makes point 2 (deduction weakened by the
non-empty condition hypothesis) necessary. For example, ⊥ > ⊤ is derived from (16); by
using both Ax.1 and the negation commutation, it is then deduced:
⊤ ≡ ⊥ > ⊥ ≡ ⊥ > ¬⊤ ≡ ¬(⊥ > ⊤) ≡ ¬⊤ ≡ ⊥ , (17)
which is impossible. Notice that this deduction is also done in DBL, if we replace the
“weakened” theorem ⊢ ¬φ, (φ|φ) by the “strong” theorem ⊢ (φ|φ) .
This example, based on VCU and DBL, illustrates a fundamental difference between DBL
and other conditional logics. DBL considers ⊥ as a singularity, and will be cautious with
this case when inferring conditionals. This principle is not just a logical artifact. In fact,
it is also deeply related to the notion of logical independence, as it appears in the proof
of theorem 3.1.12, Independence and proof.
4. Models
4.1. Definitions
Notations of Boolean algebra.
Being given a Boolean algebra [ 22], (B,∪,∩,∼, ∅,Ω), the binary operators ∪ and ∩ are
respectively the Boolean addition and multiplication, the unary operator ∼ is the Boolean
complementation, ∅ and Ω are the neutal element for ∪ and ∩ respectively. Moreover, the
order ⊂ is defined over B by setting for any A,B ∈ B:
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A ⊂ B if and only if A ∩B = A .
Definition of a conditional model.
A conditional model for DBL (respectively DBL∗) is a septuplet M = (B,∪,∩,∼
, ∅,Ω, f), where (B,∪,∩,∼, ∅,Ω) is a Boolean algebra, f : B × B −→ B, and verifying
for any A,B,C ∈ B:
β1. A ⊂ B and A 6= ∅ imply f(B,A) = Ω ,
β2. f(B ∪ C,A) ⊂ f(B,A) ∪ f(C,A) ,
β3. A ∩ f(B,A) ⊂ B ,
β4. f(∼ B,A) =∼ f(B,A) ,
β5. f(B,A) = B implies f(A,B) = A ,
(respectively β5w. f(B,A) = B implies f(B,∼ A) = B) .
The objects ∪,∩,∼, ∅,Ω, f are a model conterpart of the logical objects ∨,∧,¬,⊥,⊤, (·|·).
Definition of a conditional assignment.
Let M = (B,∪,∩,∼, ∅,Ω, f) be a conditional model.
An atomic assignment on M is a mapping h : Θ→ B .
A conditional assignment on M is a mapping H : L → B such that:
• H(¬φ) =∼ H(φ),
• H(φ→ ψ) =∼ H(φ) ∪H(ψ),
• H((ψ|φ)) = f(H(ψ), H(φ))
for any φ, ψ ∈ L .
The set of all conditional assignment on M is denoted H[M] .
Proposition 1 Let h be an atomic assignment. Then, there is a unique conditional
assignment h extending h, that is such that h(θ) = h(θ) for any θ ∈ Θ .
The construction of h is obvious.
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Semantic.
Let M be a conditional model.
Let (Γ,∆) ∈ Seq be a sequent. Then, the meta-relation Γ |=M ∆ is defined by:
Γ |=M ∆ if and only if ∀H ∈ H[M], [ ∀γ ∈ {Γ}, H(γ) = Ω ]⇒ [ ∃δ ∈ {∆}, H(δ) = Ω ] .(18)
The relation Γ |=M ∆ means that the sequent (Γ,∆) is true for the model M.
Proposition 2 Assuming Γ ⊢ ∆ , then Γ |=M ∆ for any conditional model M.
Proof is done in appendix C.
Model construction: purpose.
Typically, an ultimate issue is to construct a model for which the deduction system is
complete, i.e.:
Find M such that Γ |=M ∆ implies Γ ⊢ ∆.
This problem is not addressed in this article. Moreover, it is not clear that conditional
models are sufficient to specify the sequents.
However, the following completeness result is proved in section 4.2:
There is a conditional model M for DBL∗ such that |=M φ implies ⊢ φ for any
φ ∈ L.
This model construction is applied subsequently for constructing the probabilistic exten-
sion from LC to L for DBL or DBL∗ :
For any probability p defined over LC , there is a probability p over L which
extends p and verifies p(φ∧ψ) = p(φ)p(ψ), for any φ, ψ ∈ L such that ⊢ ψ×φ .
This result proves that DBL and DBL∗ fulfill the necessary conditions of a Bayesian logical
system.
4.2. Construction of a free conditional model for DBL∗
A free conditional model for DBL∗ is constructed now. This model, M[Θ], is such that:
|=M[Θ] φ implies ⊢ φ. It is constructed as a direct limit of partial models. These partial
models are constructed recursively, based on the iteration of (|) on any propositions.
It is recalled that Θ is a finite set.
The following result about direct limits is needed.
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4.2.1. Direct limit
Proposition 3 Let K ≥ 1 and let rk ∈ IN be defined for 1 ≤ k ≤ K . Let be given a
predicate ϕ(E,R1, . . . , RK) defined for any set E and subsets Rk ⊂ E
rk . For any n ∈ IN,
let be defined (En, R1,n, . . . , RK,n) and a mapping µn : En → En+1 verifying:
• Rk,n ⊂ E
rk
n for 1 ≤ k ≤ K,
• µn : En → En+1 is one-to-one,
• µn(Rk,n) ⊂ Rk,n+1 ,
• ϕ(En, R1,n, . . . , RK,n) holds true,
• There is m ≥ n (for any n ∈ IN) such that µm−1 ◦ · · · ◦ µn(E
rK
n ) ⊂ RK,m .
Then there exists (E∞, R1,∞, . . . , RK,∞) and a mapping sequence νn : En → E∞ for n ∈ IN,
such that:
• νn is one-to-one,
• νn = νn+1 ◦ µn,
• νn(Rk,n) ⊂ Rk,∞ , for any n ∈ IN,
• ϕ(E∞, R1,∞, . . . , RK,∞) holds true,
• For any x ∈ E∞ , there is n ∈ IN and y ∈ En such that νn(y) = x ,
• RK,∞ = E
rK
∞ .
Proof. Classical results on direct limit just give the property, excepted for the relation
RK,∞ = E
rK
∞ .
Now, let (x1, . . . , xrK ) ∈ E
rK
∞ .
For 1 ≤ k ≤ rK , there is nk ∈ IN and yk ∈ Enk such that νnk(yk) = xk .
Let N ∈ IN be such that N ≥ nk for 1 ≤ k ≤ rK .
Then, set zk = µN−1 ◦ . . . ◦ µnk(yk) .
It comes (x1, . . . , xrK ) = νN (z1, . . . , zrK ) .
Now, there is M ≥ N such that µM−1 ◦ · · · ◦ µN(E
rK
N ) ⊂ RK,M .
Then, it is deduced (x1, . . . , xrK ) ∈ νM (RK,M) ⊂ RK,∞ .
This last result just proves that ErK∞ ⊂ RK,∞ .
✷✷✷
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It is noticed that operators and relations over a set E could both be modeled by their
graph, that is a subset of a power product of E. Then, proposition 3 is quite general. In
particular, it makes possible the construction of structures with operators and relations
as a limit of partially constructed structures. The following corollary is implied.
Corollary. Let be defined a sequence (En, ∗1, . . . , ∗K, ◦)n∈IN of algebraic structures, with
common algebraic properties, where the operator ◦ is defined on subdomains Dn ⊂ E
r
n.
Let µn : En → En+1 be a one-to-one morphism; in particular:
• µn(Dn) ⊂ Dn+1 ,
• ∀(x1, . . . , xr) ∈ Dn, µn(x1 ◦ · · · ◦ xr) = µn(x1) ◦ · · · ◦ µn(xr) .
Assume moreover that:
there is m ≥ n such that µm−1 ◦ · · · ◦ µn(E
r
n) ⊂ Dm for any n ∈ IN . (19)
Then there is an algebraic structure (E∞, ∗1, . . . , ∗n, ◦), where ◦ is entirely constructed,
and one-to-one morphisms νn : En → E∞ such that:
• νn = νn+1 ◦ µn,
• For any x ∈ E∞ , there is n ∈ IN and y ∈ En such that νn(y) = x ,
• The structure (E∞, ∗1, . . . , ∗n, ◦) has the same algebraic properties than the algebras
of the sequence.
Proof. It is obtained by applying the proposition to the sequence (En, R1,n, . . . , RK+2,n)
and predicate ϕ, where:
• R1,n, . . . , RK+1,n are the graphs of the operators ∗1, . . . , ∗K , ◦ ,
• RK+2,n = Dn ,
• ϕ(E,R1, . . . , RK+2) encapsulates both the algebraic properties of the algebras,
the functional nature of the graphs, and the domain of definition of ◦.
✷✷✷
This corollary is used now for the construction of a model of DBL∗ .
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4.2.2. Definition of partial models
In this section are constructed a sequence (Bn,∪,∩,∼, ∅,Ωn, fn, bn, rn)n∈IN and a se-
quence of one-to-one morphisms (µn)n∈IN such that:
• (Bn,∪,∩,∼, ∅,Ωn) is a Boolean algebra,
• (Bn,∪,∩,∼, ∅,Ωn, fn) is a partial Bayesian model; in particular, fn is partially
constructed,
• µn : Bn → Bn+1 is a one-to-one morphism of Bayesian models,
• bn is an element of Bn ,
• At step n + 1, the definition of fn+1 is completed, so as to include the domain
µn(Bn)× {µn(bn), µn(∼ bn)} ,
• rn : Bn → IN is a ranking function; owing to the one-to-one morphism, r(A) indi-
cates the step of construction of A.
The propositions bn are chosen in order to make the sequence complient with proposition 3
(more precisely, hypothesis (19) of the corollary). The choice criterion is computed from
the ranking function.
Then, a Bayesian model is deduced by the direct limit.
Notations and definitions.
For any m > n and A ∈ Bn , it is defined A[m = µm−1 ◦ . . . ◦ µn(A) . In the case of a
subscripted propositions, say Ak, the notation Ak[m = (Ak)[m is used.
Subsequently, a singleton {ω} may be denoted ω if the context is not ambiguous. In
particular, the use of the notation ω[n instead of {ω}[n is systematic.
The Cartesian product of sets A and B is denoted A × B ; the functions id and T are
defined over pairs by id(x, y) = (x, y) and T (x, y) = (y, x) ; for a set of pairs C, the
abbreviation (id ∪ T )(C) = id(C) ∪ T (C) is also used.
Initialization.
Define (B0,∪,∩,∼, ∅,Ω0, f0, b0, r0) by:
• Ω0 = {0, 1}
Θ,
• B0 = P(Ω0) (i.e. the set of subsets of Ω0),
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• Take ∪,∩, ∅ as the set union, set intersection and empty set; define ∼ as the set
complement, that is ∼ A = Ω0 \ A ,
• Define f0(A, ∅) = f0(A,Ω0) = A for any A ∈ B0 ,
• Define r0(A) = 0 for any A ∈ B0 ,
• Choose b0 ∈ B0 \ {∅,Ω0} . It is noticed that b0 6∈ {∅,Ω0}.
Step n to step n+ 1.
Let (Bk,∪,∩,∼, ∅,Ωk, fk, bk, rk)0≤k≤n and the one-to-one morphisms (µk)0≤k≤n−1 be
constructed.
Then, construct the set In and the sequences Γn(i),Πn(i)|i∈In according to the cases:
Case 0.
There is m < n such that {bm[n,∼ bm[n} = {bn,∼ bn} .
Let ν be the greatest of such m. Notice that the hypothesis bn = bν[n holds by
construction (21). Then define In = µν(bν)× ∼ µν(bν) ,
Πn(ω, ω
′) = fn(ω
′
[n,∼ bn) ∩ ω[n and Γn(ω, ω
′) = fn(ω[n, bn) ∩ ω
′
[n for any (ω, ω
′) ∈ In .
Remark: case 0 means that the construction of f(·, bn) and of f(·,∼ bn) has already begun
over the propositions of Bν+1.
Case 1.
Case 0 does not hold;
Define In = {bn} , Πn(i) = i and Γn(i) =∼ i for any i ∈ In .
Remark: case 1 means that f(·, bn) and f(·,∼ bn) are constructed for the first time.
Setting.
(Bn+1,∪,∩,∼, ∅,Ωn+1, fn+1, bn+1, rn+1) and µn are defined by:
• µn(A) =
⋃
i∈In
((
(A ∩Πn(i))× Γn(i)
)
∪
(
(A ∩ Γn(i))× Πn(i)
))
for any A ∈ Bn ,
• Ωn+1 = µn(Ωn) ,
• Bn+1 = P(Ωn+1) ,
• Take ∪,∩, ∅ as the set union, set intersection and empty set; define ∼ as the set
complement, that is ∼ A = Ωn+1 \ A ,
• fn+1(A, ∅) = fn+1(A,Ωn+1) = A for any A ∈ Bn+1 ,
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• For any A ∈ Bn \ {bn,∼ bn, ∅,Ωn} and any B ∈ Bn such that fn(B,A) is defined,
then fn+1(µn(B), µn(A)) is defined and fn+1(µn(B), µn(A)) = µn(fn(B,A)) ,
• For any A ∈ Bn+1 , set fn+1(A, µn(bn)) = (id ∪ T )
(
A ∩
(⋃
i∈In
(Πn(i)× Γn(i))
))
and fn+1(A,∼ µn(bn)) = (id ∪ T )
(
A ∩
(⋃
i∈In
(Γn(i)× Πn(i))
))
,
• Define rn+1(µn(A)) = rn(A) for any A ∈ Bn and rn+1(A) = n + 1 for any A ∈
Bn+1 \ µn(Bn) , (rn+1 just maps to the first step of occurence of the proposition)
• Define:
b˜n+1 ∈ arg min
B∈Bn+1
λn+1(B) , where:
λn+1(B) = inf {rn+1(A) + rn+1(B) / A ∈ Bn+1 and f(A,B) is undefined} .
(20)
Then, define bn+1 by:
bn+1 = bm[n+1 if there is m ≤ n such that {b˜n+1,∼ b˜n+1} = {bm[n+1,∼ bm[n+1} ,
bn+1 = b˜n+1 otherwise.
(21)
The purpose of equation (20) is to choose bn+1 (or its negation) in order to continue
the construction of f on the oldest pairs first. By doing that, the condition (19)
of the direct limit is ensured. The purpose of equation (21) is to choose bn+1 in
coherence with a possible previous occurence. It is noticed that bn+1 6∈ {∅,Ωn+1}.
Short explanation of the model.
In fact, (ω, ω′) ∈ Πn(i) × Γn(i) should be interpreted as ω ∧ (ω
′|¬bn), while (ω
′, ω) ∈
Γn(i) × Πn(i) should be interpreted as ω
′ ∧ (ω|bn). The reader should compare this
construction to the proof of completeness in appendix E for a better comprehension of
the mechanisms of the model.
4.2.3. Properties of (Bn,∪,∩,∼, ∅,Ωn, fn, µn)n∈IN
It is proved recursively:
α1. µn : Bn → Bn+1 is a one-to-one Boolean morphism,
α2. If A,B ∈ Bn and fn(B,A) is defined, then fn+1(µn(B), µn(A)) = µn(fn(B,A)) ,
β1. Let A,B ∈ Bn such that fn(B,A) is defined.
Then A ⊂ B and A 6= ∅ imply fn(B,A) = Ωn ,
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β2. Let A,B,C ∈ Bn such that fn(B,A), fn(C,A) and fn(B ∪ C,A) are defined.
Then fn(B ∪ C,A) = fn(B,A) ∪ fn(C,A) ,
β3. Let A,B ∈ Bn such that fn(B,A) is defined.
Then A ∩ fn(B,A) = A ∩ B ,
β4. Let A,B ∈ Bn such that fn(B,A) and fn(∼ B,A) are defined.
Then fn(∼ B,A) =∼ fn(B,A) ,
β5w. Let A,B ∈ Bn such that fn(B,A) and fn(B,∼ A) are defined.
Then fn(B,A) = B implies fn(B,∼ A) = B .
Proofs are given in appendix D.
4.2.4. Limit
Corollary of proposition 3 applies to the sequence (Bn,∪,∩,∼, ∅,Ωn, fn, µn)n∈IN . In
particular, the condition (19) is derived from:
lim
n→+∞
min
B∈Bn
λn(B) = +∞ ,
which itself is a consequence of (20) and the construction process.
As a consequence, there is a Bayesian model M[Θ] = (B[Θ],∪,∩,∼, ∅,Ω, f) and a se-
quence (νn)n∈IN such that:
• νn : Bn → B[Θ] is a one-to-one morphism of Bayesian model,
• νn = νn+1 ◦ µn,
• For any A ∈ B[Θ] , there is n ∈ IN and An ∈ Bn such that νn(An) = A .
4.2.5. Completeness for the conditional operator
For any θ ∈ Θ , define ξθ ∈ B0 by ξθ = {(δτ )τ∈Θ ∈ Ω0 / δθ = 1} . Then, define the
atomic assignment h : Θ→ B[Θ] by h(θ) = ν0(ξθ) for any θ ∈ Θ . Denote h the extention
of h toward L.
Proposition 4 Let φ ∈ LC . Then, ⊢C φ if and only if h(φ) = Ω .
Proof is obvious since B0 is isomorph to the factor set of LC with respect to ≡C .
Proposition 5 Let φ ∈ L . Then, the following assertions are equivalent:
• ⊢ φ in DBL∗ ,
• h(φ) = Ω ,
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• |=M[Θ] φ .
Proof is done in appendix E .
Proposition 2 expresses that M[Θ] is complete for the conditional operator.
Proposition 6 Let φ ∈ LC , such that ⊢ φ in DBL∗ . Then ⊢C φ .
Obvious from 4 and 5.
This result proves that DBL∗ is an extension of classical logic. Now, proposition 5 implies
that DBL∗ is much more than just classical logic:
Proposition 7 [Non-distortion property] Let φ, ψ ∈ LC. Assume that ⊢ φ, ψ in DBL∗.
Then ⊢C φ or ⊢C ψ.
Interpretation: DBL∗ does not “distort” the classical propositions. More precisely, a
property like ⊢ φ, ψ would add some knowledge about φ and ψ. But the non-distortion
just tells that it is impossible unless there is a trivial knowledge about φ or ψ within
classical logic.
Proof. Assume ⊢ φ, ψ .
Since M[Θ] is a model for DBL∗, it comes that H(φ) = Ω or H(ψ) = Ω for any
H ∈ H[M[Θ]] .
In particular, h(φ) = Ω or h(ψ) = Ω (definition (18) ) .
Since φ ∈ LC and ψ ∈ LC , it comes ⊢C φ or ⊢C ψ .
✷✷✷
Another non-distortion property is derived subsequently in the context of probabilistic
DBL∗ .
5. Extension of probability
5.1. Probability over propositions
Probabilities are classically defined over measurable sets. However, this is only a man-
ner to model the notion of probability, which is essentially an additive measure of the
belief of logical propositions. Probability could be defined without reference to the mea-
sure theory, at least when the propositions are countable. The notion of probability is
explained now within a strict propositional formalism. Conditional probabilities are ex-
cluded from this definition, but the notion of independence is considered.
Intuitively, a probability over a space of logical propositions is a measure of belief which is
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additive (disjoint propositions are adding their chances) and increasing with the proposi-
tions. This measure should be zeroed for the contradiction and set to 1 for the tautology.
Moreover, a probability is a multiplicative measure for independent propositions.
Definition for classical propositions.
A probability π over C , the classical logic, is a IR+ valued function such that for any
propositions φ and ψ of LC :
Equivalence. φ ≡C ψ implies π(φ) = π(ψ) ,
Additivity. π(φ ∧ ψ) + π(φ ∨ ψ) = π(φ) + π(ψ) ,
Coherence. π(⊥) = 0 ,
Finiteness. π(⊤) = 1 .
Property.
The coherence and additivity implies the increase of π:
Increase. π(φ ∧ ψ) ≤ π(φ) .
Proof. Since φ ≡C (φ∧ψ)∨(φ∧¬ψ) and (φ∧ψ)∧(φ∧¬ψ) ≡C ⊥, the additivity implies:
π(φ) + π(⊥) = π(φ ∧ ψ) + π(φ ∧ ¬ψ) .
From the coherence π(⊥) = 0 , it is deduced π(φ) = π(φ ∧ ψ) + π(φ ∧ ¬ψ) .
Since π is non-negatively valued, π(φ) ≥ π(φ ∧ ψ) .
✷✷✷
Definition for DBL/DBL∗.
In this case, we have to deal with independence notions.
A probability P over DBL/DBL∗ is a IR
+ valued function, which verifies (replace ≡C by
≡ and π by P ) equivalence, additivity, coherence, finiteness and:
Multiplicativity. ⊢ φ× ψ implies P (φ ∧ ψ) = P (φ)P (ψ) .
for any propositions φ and ψ of L .
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5.2. Probability extension over DBL∗
Proposition 8 Let π be a probability defined over C , the classical logic, such that π(φ) >
0 for any φ 6≡C ⊥. Then, there is a (multiplicative) probability π defined over DBL∗ such
that π(φ) = π(φ) for any classical proposition φ ∈ LC .
Remark: this is another non-distortion property, since the construction of DBL∗ puts no
constraint over probabilistic classical propositions.
Proof is done in appendix F.
Corollary. Let π be a probability defined over C . Then, there is a (multiplicative)
probability π defined over DBL∗ such that π(φ) = π(φ) for any φ ∈ LC .
Proof. Let Σ =
{∧
θ∈Θ ǫθ
/
ǫ ∈
∏
θ∈Θ{θ,¬θ}
}
, a generating partition of LC .
For any real number e > 0 , define the probability πe over LC by:
∀σ ∈ Σ , πe(σ) =
e
card(Σ)
+ (1− e)π(σ) .
Let πe be the extension of πe over DBL∗ as constructed in appendix F.
It is noticed in F.2.3 , that there is by construction a rational function Rφ such that
πe(φ) = Rφ(e) for any φ ∈ L .
Now 0 ≤ Rφ(e) ≤ 1 ; since Rφ(e) is rational and bounded, lime→0+Rφ(e) exists.
Define π(φ) = lime→0+Rφ(e) , for any φ ∈ L.
The additivity, coherence, finiteness and multiplicativity are then inherited by π.
At last, it is clear that π(σ) = π(σ) for any σ ∈ Σ .
✷✷✷
5.3. Model and probability extension for DBL
Let K be the set of all (multiplicative) probabilities P over DBL∗ such that P (φ) > 0
for any φ 6≡ ⊥ , and define the sequences K(φ) = (P (φ))P∈K for any φ ∈ L .
Then define LK = K(L) = {K(φ) / φ ∈ L} ; The space LK is thus a subset of IR
+K .
The operators ¬, ∧, ∨ and (|) are canonically implied over LK :
¬K(φ) = K(¬φ) , K(φ) ∧ K(ψ) = K(φ ∧ ψ) , K(φ) ∨ K(ψ) = K(φ ∨ ψ)
and (K(ψ)|K(φ)) = K((ψ|φ)) .
Since any P ∈ K verifies the equivalence property, it comes K(φ) = K(ψ) when φ ≡ ψ in
DBL∗. In particular, (LK,∨,∧,¬,K(⊥),K(⊤)) is a Boolean algebra.
Proposition 9 (LK,∨,∧,¬,K(⊥),K(⊤), (|)) is a conditional model of DBL.
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Proof. Since φ ≡ ψ in DBL∗ implies K(φ) = K(ψ) , it comes β2, β3 and β4, from axioms
b2, b3 and b4.
Proof of β1. Assume K(φ→ ψ) = K(⊤) and K(φ) 6= K(⊥) .
Let P ∈ K .
Then P (¬φ ∨ ψ) = P (φ→ ψ) = P (⊤) = 1 .
Now P (¬φ ∨ ψ) = 1 implies P (φ ∧ ψ) + P (¬φ) = 1 .
As a consequence, P (φ ∧ ψ) = 1− P (¬φ) = P (φ).
Now, Hypothesis K(φ) 6= K(⊥) implies φ 6≡ ⊥ and then P (φ) 6= 0 .
Since P is multiplicative and P (φ) 6= 0 , it comes P ((ψ|φ)) = P (φ ∧ ψ)/P (φ) = 1 .
At last, K(ψ|φ) = K(⊤) and, consequently, (K(ψ)|K(φ)) = K(⊤) .
The model verifies β1.
Proof of β5. Since P is multiplicative for any P ∈ K , ⊢ (ψ|φ)×φ and (ψ|φ)∧φ ≡ ψ∧φ
in DBL∗, it comes P ((ψ|φ))P (φ) = P (ψ ∧ φ) for any P ∈ K .
Now assume (K(ψ)|K(φ)) = K(ψ) , with ψ 6≡ ⊥ .
Then K((ψ|φ)) = K(ψ), and P ((ψ|φ)) = P (ψ) for any P ∈ K .
Then P (φ) = P (ψ ∧ φ)/P ((ψ|φ)) = P (ψ ∧ φ)/P (ψ) = P ((φ|ψ)) for any P ∈ K ,
and (K(φ)|K(ψ)) = K((φ|ψ)) = K(φ) .
Since moreover (φ|⊥) ≡ φ and (⊥|φ) ≡ ⊥ in DBL∗, the model verifies β5 .
✷✷✷
Corollary. φ ≡ ψ in DBL implies K(φ) = K(ψ).
Probability extension.
The corollary implies that any P ∈ K is a (multiplicative) probability over DBL.
Now, the probability extensions constructed in appendix F are also elements of K . As a
consequence, the proposition 8 as well as its corollary still work in DBL:
Proposition 10 Let π be a probability defined over C , the classical logic. Then, there is
a (multiplicative) probability π defined over DBL such that π(φ) = π(φ) for any φ ∈ LC .
Non-distortion.
Proposition 11 Let φ, ψ be classical propositions. Assume that ⊢ φ, ψ in DBL. Then
⊢C φ or ⊢C ψ.
Proof. Notice first that K : φ 7→ K(φ) is a conditional assignment by construction.
From proposition 9, ⊢ φ, ψ implies K(φ) = K(⊤) or K(ψ) = K(⊤) .
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It follows ∀P ∈ K , P (φ) = 1 or ∀P ∈ K , P (ψ) = 1 .
By the probability extension: ∀π , π(φ) = 1 or ∀π , π(ψ) = 1 , where π denotes any
probability over C .
At last, ⊢C φ or ⊢C ψ .
✷✷✷
5.4. Properties of the conditional
Bayes inference.
Assume a (multiplicative) probability P defined over DBL/DBL∗. Define P (ψ|φ) as an
abbreviation for P ((ψ|φ)) . Then:
P (ψ|φ)P (φ) = P (φ ∧ ψ) .
Proof. A consequence of (ψ|φ) ∧ φ ≡ φ ∧ ψ and ⊢ (ψ|φ)× φ .
✷✷✷
About Lewis’ triviality.
The previous extension theorems has shown that for any probability π defined over C ,
it is possible to construct a (multiplicative) probability π over DBL which extends π. This
result by itself shows that DBL avoids Lewis’ triviality. But a deeper explanation seems
necessary.
Assume φ ∈ LC and define the probability πφ over C by πφ = π(·|φ) . Let πφ be the
extension of πφ over DBL. It happens that πφ 6= π(·|φ) , which implies that Lewis’ triviality
does not work anymore. It is noticed that although π(·|φ) is a probability over DBL in the
classical meaning (it is additive, coherent and finite), it is not necessarily multiplicative.
Conditional probabilities do not recognize the logical independence and the
logical conditioning.
This limitation is unavoidable: otherwise the derivation (1) of the triviality is possible,
even if (ψ|φ) is not equivalent to a classical proposition.
6. Conclusion
In this contribution, the conditional logics DBL and DBL∗, a slight relaxation of DBL,
have been defined and studied. These logics have been introduced as an abstraction and
extrapolation of general probabilistic properties. DBL and DBL∗ implement the essential
ingredients of the Bayesian inference, including the classical nature of the sub-universe,
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the inference property and a related concept of logical independence.
The logics are coherent and non-trivial. A model has been constructed for the logic
DBL∗, and completeness results have been derived. It has been shown that any probabil-
ity over the classical propositions could be extended to DBL/DBL∗, in compliance with
the independence relation. Then, the probabilistic Bayesian rule has been recovered from
DBL/DBL∗.
There are still many open questions. For example, it is possible to bring some enrichment
to the conditional of DBL, by means of additional axioms. It is also possible to consider
other valuation mechanisms than the probabilities. As a perspective, many decision sys-
tems for manipulating uncertain information could be derived from this principle. From
the strict logical viewpoint, the Deterministic Bayesian Logic also offers some interesting
properties. In particular, the notion of independence in DBL have nice logical conse-
quences in the deductions (e.g. regularity with an inference). This property should be of
interest in mathematical logic.
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A. Classical subsystem
In this section is considered the deduction subsystem made up of rules CUT and
STRUCT combined with axioms modus ponens and c∗. It is first shown that this sub-
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system, called classical subsystem of DBL, infers the classical tautologies. However, the
system is essentially different from the sequent calculus LK and differences are analysed.
Subsequently, the notation ⊢C is used in order to indicate that the proofs are derived
within the classical subsystem of DBL.
These properties also hold true within DBL, while replacing ⊢C by ⊢.
Proposition 12 Assuming ⊢C φ and ⊢C φ→ ψ, it is deduced ⊢C ψ .
This is just a modus ponens rule for sequents of the form ⊢C φ.
Proof. Obtained by applying CUT and the axiom modus ponens.
✷✷✷
Proposition 13 Assume that φ is a tautology of classical logic. Then ⊢C φ is deduced
from the classical subsystem of DBL.
Proof. It is known that tautologies of classical logic are obtained by applying the modus
ponens and the axioms φ → (ψ → φ) , (η → (φ → ψ)) → ((η → φ) → (η → ψ))
and (¬φ→ ¬ψ)→ ((¬φ→ ψ)→ φ) .
Proposition 13 is then a consequence of propositin 12 and axioms c1, c2, c3.
✷✷✷
Proposition 13 has shown that the classical subsystem of DBL infers the classical tautolo-
gies, actually expressed as sequents of only one right formula. Now, the case of general
sequents is not managed by proposition 13. It happens that there are strong difference
between DBL and the classical sequent calculus LK. Although most rules of LK could be
derived from the classical subsystem of DBL, some rules for manipulating the disjunction
and the negation do not hold anymore.
The following table enumerates rules of LK [ 12], derived from DBL. The table also indi-
cates the classical tautologies, from which the rules are derived, and intermediate sequents
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in this derivation (several CUTs are used):
LK rule Original Intermediate
tautology sequent
φ ⊢ φ
(I) ⊢C φ→ φ φ ⊢C φ
Γ, φ ⊢ ∆
Γ, φ ∧ ψ ⊢ ∆
(∧L) ⊢C (φ ∧ ψ)→ φ φ ∧ ψ ⊢C φ
Γ ⊢ φ,∆
Γ ⊢ φ ∨ ψ,∆
(∨R) ⊢C φ→ (φ ∨ ψ) φ ⊢C φ ∨ ψ
Γ ⊢ φ,∆ Σ ⊢ ψ,Π
Γ,Σ ⊢ φ ∧ ψ,∆,Π
(∧R) ⊢C φ→ (ψ → (φ ∧ ψ)) φ, ψ ⊢C φ ∧ ψ
Γ ⊢ φ,∆ Σ, ψ ⊢ Π
Γ,Σ, φ→ ψ ⊢ ∆,Π
(→ L) φ, φ→ ψ ⊢C ψ (m.p.)
Γ ⊢ φ,∆
Γ,¬φ ⊢ ∆
(¬L) ⊢C φ→ (¬φ→ ⊥) φ,¬φ ⊢C
The deduction of ¬L is typical and is illustrated now.
Derivation of ¬L. First at all, ⊢C φ→ (¬φ→ ⊥) is derived as a tautology.
Applying CUT and axiom m.p., it comes φ,¬φ ⊢C ⊥ .
Applying STRUCT, it comes φ,¬φ ⊢C .
Using CUT together with Γ ⊢C φ,∆, it is derived Γ,¬φ ⊢C ∆.
✷✷✷
On the other hand, the rules:
Γ, φ ⊢ ∆ Σ, ψ ⊢ Π
Γ,Σ, φ ∨ ψ ⊢ ∆,Π
(∨L) ,
Γ, φ ⊢ ψ,∆
Γ ⊢ φ→ ψ,∆
(→ R) ,
Γ, φ ⊢ ∆
Γ ⊢ ¬φ,∆
(¬R)
of LK cannot be deduced from DBL. In particular, the sequents:
φ ∨ ψ ⊢ φ, ψ and ⊢ φ,¬φ are not implied by DBL (e.g. refer to proposition 11). (22)
These facts are obtained from the model construction of DBL.
B. Proof: the logical theorems
For concision, details of the sequent derivations are omitted, in particular concerning
classical deductions. Appendix A establishes some important facts about the classical
deduction within DBL. It is noticed that some deductions of the sequent calculus LK are
not allowed. The rules of DBL are still powerful and sufficient though.
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Axioms order.
By b4, ¬φ× ψ = (¬φ|ψ)↔ ¬φ ≡ ¬(φ|ψ)↔ ¬φ ≡ (φ|ψ)↔ φ = φ× ψ.
Then ¬φ× ψ ⊢ φ× ψ and φ× ψ ⊢ ¬φ× ψ , by applying modus ponens and CUT.
Now, b5 implies ψ × φ ⊢ φ× ψ, φ× ψ ⊢ ψ × φ, ¬φ× ψ ⊢ ψ × ¬φ and ψ × ¬φ ⊢ ¬φ× ψ.
Applying CUT then yields ψ × φ ⊢ ψ × ¬φ and ψ × ¬φ ⊢ ψ × φ.
The empty universe.
Theorem 3.1.1 implies ¬φ ⊢ ψ × ¬φ.
By applying b5.weak.A and CUT, it comes ¬φ ⊢ ψ × φ.
The remaining proof is obvious.
Left equivalences.
Proof of the main theorem.
Sequent ψ → η ⊢ φ→ (ψ → η) is deduced classically.
Now, axiom b1 implies φ→ (ψ → η) ⊢ ¬φ, (ψ → η|φ).
And by CUT, ψ → η ⊢ ¬φ, (ψ → η|φ) .
Now, b2, modus ponens and CUT implies (ψ → η|φ) ⊢ (ψ|φ)→ (η|φ) .
Applying CUT agains, it comes ψ → η ⊢ ¬φ, (ψ|φ)→ (η|φ) .
Since ψ and η are exchangeable, the theorem is deduced.
Proof of the corollary.
From 3.1.3, it comes ¬φ ⊢ (ψ|φ)↔ ψ and ¬φ ⊢ (η|φ)↔ η.
Then ¬φ, ψ ↔ η ⊢ (ψ|φ)↔ (η|φ) by classical deductions.
The corollary is deduced by CUT with ψ → η ⊢ ¬φ, (ψ|φ)→ (η|φ) and STRUCT.
Sub-universes are classical.
The first theorem is a consequence of axiom b4.
From axiom b2 , it is deduced ⊢ (ψ → ¬η|φ)→ ((ψ|φ)→ (¬η|φ)) .
It is deduced ⊢ ((ψ|φ) ∧ ¬(¬η|φ))→ ¬(ψ → ¬η|φ) .
Applying b4, it comes ⊢ ((ψ|φ) ∧ (η|φ))→ (ψ ∧ η|φ).
Conversely, ⊢ φ→ ((ψ ∧ η)→ ψ) and b1 imply ⊢ ¬φ, ((ψ ∧ η)→ ψ|φ).
By b2 it is deduced ⊢ ¬φ, (ψ ∧ η|φ)→ (ψ|φ).
It is similarly proved ⊢ ¬φ, (ψ ∧ η|φ)→ (η|φ).
As a consequence, ⊢ ¬φ, (ψ ∧ η|φ)→ ((ψ|φ) ∧ (η|φ)).
Moreover, 3.1.3 implies ¬φ ⊢ (Ξ|φ)↔ Ξ for Ξ = ψ, η or ψ ∧ η.
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It comes ¬φ ⊢ (ψ ∧ η|φ)→ ((ψ|φ) ∧ (η|φ)) by a classical deduction.
By CUT on the derived sequents and STRUCT, it is deduced ⊢ (ψ∧η|φ)→ ((ψ|φ)∧(η|φ)).
The second theorem is then proved.
Third theorem is a consequence of the first and second theorems.
Last theorem is a consequence of the first and third theorems.
Evaluating (⊤|·) and (⊥|·) .
From b1, it comes φ→ ψ ⊢ ¬φ, (ψ|φ) .
From ⊢ ψ → (φ→ ψ) , modus ponens and CUT, it comes ψ ⊢ φ→ ψ .
Then ψ ⊢ ¬φ, (ψ|φ) by CUT .
Now ¬φ ⊢ (ψ|φ)↔ ψ by 3.1.3, resulting in ¬φ ⊢ ψ → (ψ|φ) and ¬φ, ψ ⊢ (ψ|φ).
Then ψ ⊢ (ψ|φ) , as a consequence of CUT and STRUCT.
Inference property.
From b3 it comes ⊢ (¬ψ|φ)→ (φ→ ¬ψ) .
Then ⊢ ¬(φ→ ¬ψ)→ ¬(¬ψ|φ) and ⊢ (φ ∧ ψ)→ (ψ|φ) by using b4.
At last ⊢ (φ ∧ ψ)→ ((ψ|φ) ∧ φ) .
Conversely ⊢ (ψ|φ)→ (φ→ ψ) implies ⊢ ((ψ|φ) ∧ φ)→ ((φ→ ψ) ∧ φ) .
Since (φ→ ψ) ∧ φ ≡ φ ∧ ψ , the converse is proved.
Introspection.
Obvious from ⊢ φ→ φ, b1 and CUT .
Inter-independence.
It is proved:
((ψ|φ)|φ) ∧ (φ|φ) ≡ ((ψ|φ) ∧ φ|φ) ≡ (φ ∧ ψ|φ) ≡ (ψ|φ) ∧ (φ|φ) .
As a consequence ⊢ (φ|φ)→
(
((ψ|φ)|φ)↔ (ψ|φ)
)
, and then (φ|φ) ⊢ (ψ|φ)× φ .
Now ⊢ ¬φ, (φ|φ) by 3.1.8 and ¬φ ⊢ (ψ|φ)× φ as an instance of 3.1.3.
At last ⊢ (ψ|φ)× φ , by applying CUT and STRUCT.
Independence invariance.
Since (ψ|φ)↔ ψ ≡ ¬(ψ|φ)↔ ¬ψ ≡ (¬ψ|φ)↔ ¬ψ, it comes ψ × φ ⊢ ¬ψ × φ .
Obviously, (ψ|φ)↔ ψ, (η|φ)↔ η ⊢ ((ψ|φ) ∧ (η|φ))↔ (ψ ∧ η) .
Applying 3.1.5, it comes ψ × φ, η × φ ⊢ (ψ ∧ η)× φ .
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From ⊢ (α↔ β)→
(
(γ ↔ δ)→ ((α↔ γ)→ (β ↔ δ))
)
is deduced
α↔ β, γ ↔ δ, α↔ γ ⊢ β ↔ δ .
Now, 3.1.4 implies ψ ↔ η ⊢ (ψ|φ)↔ (η|φ).
By replacing α, β, γ, δ by ψ, η, (ψ|φ), (η|φ) respectively, and applying CUT, it comes
ψ ↔ η, ψ × φ ⊢ η × φ .
Narcissistic independence.
From 3.1.8 comes ⊢ ¬φ, (φ|φ) .
From definition comes ⊢ (φ× φ)→ ((φ|φ)→ φ) and then φ× φ, (φ|φ) ⊢ φ.
Applying CUT, it is thus deduced φ× φ ⊢ ¬φ, φ .
Independence and proof.
From ⊢ (φ ∨ ψ)→ (¬φ→ ψ) is deduced φ ∨ ψ ⊢ ¬φ→ ψ .
From b1 comes ¬φ→ ψ ⊢ φ, (ψ|¬φ) .
Applying CUT then yields φ ∨ ψ ⊢ φ, (ψ|¬φ) .
From b5.weak.A, it comes ψ × φ ⊢ (ψ|¬φ)↔ ψ , and then ψ × φ, (ψ|¬φ) ⊢ ψ .
Applying CUT, it is deduced ψ × φ, φ ∨ ψ ⊢ φ, ψ .
Independence and regularity.
Proof of the main theorem.
It is proved classically that (φ ∧ η)→ (ψ ∧ η) ≡ ¬η ∨ (φ→ ψ) .
Then (φ ∧ η)→ (ψ ∧ η) ⊢ ¬η ∨ (φ→ ψ) .
Now, it is deduced φ× η, ψ × η ⊢ (φ→ ψ)× ¬η from 3.1.10 and b5.weak.A.
The proof is achieved by means of 3.1.12 and CUT.
Corollary is proved by applying CUT.
Proof of Corollary 2.
Assume ⊢ X × φ and ¬φ ⊢ .
Since ⊢ (ψ|φ)×φ and ψ∧φ ≡ (ψ|φ)∧φ, it is deduced from X∧φ ≡ ψ∧φ that X ≡ (ψ|φ).
Right equivalences.
First notice that all previous properties, 3.1.1 to 3.1.13, are obtained without b5.weak.B.
From (φ|ψ) ∧ ψ ≡ φ ∧ ψ, (φ|η) ∧ η ≡ φ ∧ η and ⊢ (ψ ↔ η)→ ((φ ∧ ψ)↔ (φ ∧ η)), it is
deduced ⊢ (ψ ↔ η)→
(
((φ|ψ) ∧ ψ)↔ ((φ|η) ∧ η)
)
.
Then ⊢ (ψ ↔ η)→
(
((φ|ψ) ∧ ψ)↔ ((φ|η) ∧ ψ)
)
and finally
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ψ ↔ η ⊢ ((φ|ψ) ∧ ψ)↔ ((φ|η) ∧ ψ) [a] .
Now ⊢ (φ|ψ)× ψ [b] and ⊢ (φ|η)× η .
Since ψ ↔ η, η × (φ|η) ⊢ ψ × (φ|η) by 3.1.5, it comes ψ ↔ η ⊢ (φ|η)× ψ [c] by b5, CUT.
Now, 3.1.13 implies (φ|ψ)× ψ, (φ|η)× ψ, ((φ|ψ) ∧ ψ)↔ ((φ|η) ∧ ψ) ⊢ ¬ψ, (φ|ψ)↔ (φ|η).
Combining it with [a], [b] and [c] by CUT, it is obtained ψ ↔ η ⊢ ¬ψ, (φ|ψ)↔ (φ|η) [d] .
Now, 3.1.3 implies ¬η ⊢ (φ|η)↔ φ .
It is easily proved ψ ↔ η,¬ψ ⊢ ¬η, and it is deduced ¬ψ, ψ ↔ η ⊢ (φ|η)↔ φ by CUT.
Again, 3.1.3 yields ¬ψ ⊢ (φ|ψ)↔ φ, which combined with the previous sequent implies
¬ψ, ψ ↔ η ⊢ (φ|η)↔ (φ|ψ) [e].
At last, ψ ↔ η ⊢ (φ|η)↔ (φ|ψ) is obtained from [d] and [e] by CUT and STRUCT.
Reduction rule.
⊢ (ψ|φ)× φ from 3.1.9 and (ψ|φ)× φ ⊢ φ× (ψ|φ) from b5 yield ⊢ φ× (ψ|φ) by CUT.
Then (φ|(ψ|φ)) ≡ φ is just obtained as the definition of ⊢ φ× (ψ|φ) .
Markov Property.
⊢ (φt|φt−1)× φt−1 from 3.1.9, and then, it is easily derived
(φt|φt−1)× φ1, . . . , (φt|φt−1)× φt−2 ⊢ (φt|φt−1)×
∧t−1
τ=1 φτ .
Now, (φt|φt−1) ∧
(∧t−1
τ=1 φτ
)
≡
∧t
τ=1 φτ ≡
(
φt
∣∣∧t−1
τ=1 φτ
)
∧
(∧t−1
τ=1 φτ
)
.
Since ⊢
(
φt
∣∣∧t−1
τ=1 φτ
)
×
(∧t−1
τ=1 φτ
)
, the proof is achieved by applying 3.1.13.
Link between ((η|ψ)|φ) and (η|φ ∧ ψ).
Proof of the logical counterpart to Lewis’ triviality.
It is equivalent to prove both ⊢ ¬(φ ∧ ψ), φ→ ψ, φ× ψ and ⊢ ¬(φ ∧ ψ), ψ → φ, φ× ψ.
Since × is symmetric, it is sufficient to prove ⊢ ¬(φ ∧ ψ), φ→ ψ, φ× ψ.
Therorem 3.1.8 implies ⊢ ¬(φ ∧ ψ), (φ ∧ ψ|φ ∧ ψ) [a] and ⊢ φ→ ψ, (¬ψ ∧ φ|¬ψ ∧ φ) .
It is deduced ⊢ ¬(φ ∧ ψ), (ψ|ψ ∧ φ)↔((ψ|ψ ∧ φ) ∧ (ψ ∧ φ|ψ ∧ φ)) [b] and
⊢ φ→ ψ, (ψ|¬ψ ∧ φ)↔((ψ|¬ψ ∧ φ) ∧ (¬ψ ∧ φ|¬ψ ∧ φ)).
From the deduction (ψ|¬ψ ∧ φ) ∧ (¬ψ ∧ φ|¬ψ ∧ φ) ≡ (⊥|¬ψ ∧ φ) ≡ ⊥, it is derived
⊢ φ→ ψ, (ψ|¬ψ ∧ φ)↔ ⊥ [c].
From the deduction (ψ|ψ ∧ φ) ∧ (ψ ∧ φ|ψ ∧ φ) ≡ (ψ ∧ φ|ψ ∧ φ), [a] and [b], it comes
⊢ ¬(φ ∧ ψ), (ψ|ψ ∧ φ)↔ ⊤ [d].
Now (ψ|φ) ≡ ((ψ|φ) ∧ ψ) ∨ ((ψ|φ) ∧ ¬ψ) ≡
(
((ψ|φ)|ψ) ∧ ψ
)
∨
(
((ψ|φ)|¬ψ) ∧ ¬ψ
)
, and
by applying axiom (∗), (ψ|φ) ≡ ((ψ|φ ∧ ψ) ∧ ψ) ∨ ((ψ|φ ∧ ¬ψ) ∧ ¬ψ).
Then ⊢ φ→ ψ,¬(φ ∧ ψ), (ψ|φ)↔ ((⊤ ∧ ψ) ∨ (⊥ ∧ ¬ψ)) by means of [c] and [d].
At last ⊢ φ→ ψ,¬(φ ∧ ψ), (ψ|φ)↔ ψ .
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C. Proof: soundness of the semantic
The proof of proposition 2 is made recursively. It is first proved that any axiom of DBL
(resp. DBL∗) is true for any conditional model. Then it is proved that the rules STRUCT
and CUT are compliant with any conditional model.
Axiom modus ponens.
Being assumed H(φ) = Ω and ∼ H(φ) ∪H(ψ) = Ω , it is implied H(ψ) = Ω.
As a consequence, φ, φ→ ψ |=M ψ .
Axiom c1 to c3.
Immediate since (B,∪,∩,∼, ∅,Ω) is a Boolean algebra.
Axiom b1.
Assume H(φ→ ψ) = Ω .
Then ∼ H(φ) ∪H(ψ) = Ω and, consequently, H(φ) ⊂ H(ψ) .
Since M fulfilles β1 , it comes ∼ H(φ) = Ω or f(H(ψ), H(φ)) = Ω .
As a consequence, H(¬φ) = Ω or H((ψ|φ)) = Ω .
It is deduced φ→ ψ |=M ¬φ, (ψ|φ) .
Axiom b2.
Deduced from β2 and β4 .
Axiom b3.
Deduced from β3.
Axiom b4.
Immediate from β4.
Axiom b5.
Applying β5, it is deduced that H((ψ|φ)) = H(ψ) implies H((φ|ψ)) = H(φ) .
Now, it is noticed that H(φ) = H(ψ) if and only if H(φ↔ ψ) = Ω .
As a consequence, H(ψ × φ) = Ω implies H(φ× ψ) = Ω .
Then, ψ × φ |=M φ× ψ .
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Axiom b5.weak.A
Assume H((ψ|φ)↔ ψ) = Ω .
Then H((ψ|φ)) = H(ψ) , and f(H(ψ), H(φ)) = H(ψ) .
By applying β5w, it comes f(H(ψ),∼ H(φ)) = H(ψ) .
It follows H((ψ|¬φ)) = H(ψ) and finally H((ψ|¬φ)↔ ψ) = Ω .
As a consequence, ψ × φ |=M ψ × ¬φ .
ψ × ¬φ |=M ψ × φ is an immediate corollary.
Axiom b5.weak.B
Assume H(ψ ↔ η) = Ω
Then, it is implied H(ψ) = H(η) .
As a consequence, f(H(φ), H(ψ)) = f(H(φ), H(η)) .
Then, H((φ|ψ)) = H((φ|η)) and H((φ|ψ)↔ (φ|η)) = Ω .
Consequently, ψ ↔ η |=M (φ|ψ)↔ (φ|η) .
Rule CUT.
Immediate.
Rule STRUCT.
It is recalled that ⊤ = θ1 → θ1 and ⊥ = ¬⊤ , where θ1 ∈ Θ .
As a consequence, H(⊤) =∼ H(θ1) ∪H(θ1) = Ω and H(⊥) =∼ H(⊤) = ∅ 6= Ω .
Then, {Γ} ⊂ {Λ} ∪ {⊤} , {∆} ⊂ {Σ} ∪ {⊥} and Γ |=M ∆ imply Λ |=M Σ .
D. Proof: properties of (Bn,∪,∩,∼, ∅,Ωn, fn, µn)n∈IN
To be proved:
α1 µn : Bn → Bn+1 is a one-to-one Boolean morphism ,
α2 fn+1(µn(B), µn(A)) = µn(fn(B,A)) ,
β1. A ⊂ B and A 6= ∅ imply fn(B,A) = Ωn ,
β2. fn(B ∪ C,A) = fn(B,A) ∪ fn(C,A) ,
β3. A ∩ fn(B,A) = A ∩ B ,
β4. fn(∼ B,A) =∼ fn(B,A) ,
β5w. fn(B,A) = B implies fn(B,∼ A) = B ,
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being assumed A,B,C ∈ Bn , and fn(·, ·) defined for the considered cases.
The proof is recursive and needs to consider the two cases of the definition of (µn, fn) .
The properties β∗ are obvious for n = 0, since f0 is only defined by f0(A, ∅) = f0(A,Ω0) =
A . From now on, it is assumed that β∗ hold true for k ≤ n, and that α1 and α2 hold
true for k ≤ n − 1 . The subsequent paragraphs establish the proof of β∗ for n + 1 and
the proof of α1 and α2 for n.
Preliminary remarks.
It is noticed that β2 and β4 imply:
β6 : fn(B ∩ C,A) = fn(B,A) ∩ fn(C,A) .
By construction, it is noticed that fn(∅, A) = ∅, when fn(∅, A) exists.
D.1. Lemma.⋃
i∈In
Πn(i) = bn and
⋃
i∈In
Γn(i) =∼ bn ; in particular, Πn(i) ∩ Γn(j) = ∅ for any
i, j ∈ In .
Moreover Πn(i) ∩ Πn(j) = Γn(i) ∩ Γn(j) = ∅ for any i, j ∈ In such that i 6= j .
Proof. The proof is obvious for case 1.
Now, let consider case 0.
By definition
⋃
i∈In
Πn(i) =
(⋃
ω∈µν(bν)
ω[n
)
∩
(⋃
ω′∈∼µν(bν)
fn(ω
′
[n,∼ bn)
)
.
By recursion hypothesis β1, it comes fn(∼ bn,∼ bn) = Ωn .
Since bn = bν[n and by β2 and α1 , it comes⋃
i∈In
Πn(i) = bn ∩ fn(∼ bn,∼ bn) = bn ∩ Ωn = bn .
For any ω1, ω2 ∈∼ µν(bν) such that ω1 6= ω2 , it comes by β6 (i.e. by β2 and β4) :
fn(ω1[n,∼ bn) ∩ fn(ω2[n,∼ bn) = fn(ω1[n ∩ ω2[n,∼ bn) = fn(∅,∼ bn) = ∅ .
Finally Πn(i) ∩Πn(j) = ∅ for any i, j ∈ In such that i 6= j .
The results are similarly proved for Γn .
✷✷✷
Corollary 1.
µn(bn) = T (∼ µn(bn)) =
⋃
i∈In
Πn(i)×Γn(i) and ∼ µn(bn) = T (µn(bn)) =
⋃
i∈In
Γn(i)×Πn(i) .
Corollary 2.
fn+1(C, µn(bn)) = (C ∩ µn(bn)) ∪ (T (C)∩ ∼ µn(bn))
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and
fn+1(C,∼ µn(bn)) = (T (C) ∩ µn(bn)) ∪ (C∩ ∼ µn(bn)) .
Both corollaries are obvious from the definition.
D.2. Useful set properties
The following properties (whose proofs are immediate) will be useful:
ℓ1. (A ∪ B)× C = (A× C) ∪ (B × C) and A× (B ∪ C) = (A× B) ∪ (A× C) ,
ℓ2. (A ∩ B)× C = (A× C) ∩ (B × C) and A× (B ∩ C) = (A× B) ∩ (A× C) ,
ℓ3. C ∩D = ∅ implies (C × A) ∩ (D × B) = (A× C) ∩ (B ×D) = ∅ ,
ℓ4. (A ∪ B) ∩ (C ∪D) = ∅ implies (A ∩B) ∪ (C ∩D) = (A ∪ C) ∩ (B ∪D) ,
ℓ5. (A ∪ B) ∩ (C ∪D) = ∅ and A ∪ C = B ∪D imply A = B and C = D ,
ℓ6. C ∩D = ∅ implies (C ∪D) \ ((A ∩ C) ∪ (B ∩D)) = (C \ A) ∪ (D \B) ,
for any sets A,B,C,D .
D.3. Proof of α1
Proof of µn(Ωn) = Ωn+1 and µn(∅) = ∅ .
Immediate from the definitions.
Proof of µn(A ∩B) = µn(A) ∩ µn(B) .
By applying ℓ2, it is deduced:
µn(A ∩ B) =
⋃
i∈In
((
(A ∩Πn(i))× Γn(i)
)
∩
(
(B ∩ Πn(i))× Γn(i)
))
∪
⋃
i∈In
((
(A ∩ Γn(i))× Πn(i)
)
∩
(
(B ∩ Γn(i))× Πn(i)
))
.
By lemma D.1, and applying ℓ3 and ℓ4, it is deduced:
µn(A ∩B) =
⋃
i∈In
((
(A ∩ Πn(i))× Γn(i)
)
∪
(
(A ∩ Γn(i))× Πn(i)
))
∩
⋃
i∈In
((
(B ∩Πn(i))× Γn(i)
)
∪
(
(B ∩ Γn(i))×Πn(i)
))
= µn(A) ∩ µn(B) .
Proof of µn(A ∪B) = µn(A) ∪ µn(B) .
Obviously deduced from ℓ1.
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µn is one-to-one.
Assume µn(A) = µn(B) ; then:⋃
i∈In
((
(A ∩Πn(i))× Γn(i)
)
∪
(
(A ∩ Γn(i))× Πn(i)
))
=
⋃
i∈In
((
(B ∩ Πn(i))× Γn(i)
)
∪
(
(B ∩ Γn(i))× Πn(i)
))
.
By lemma D.1, and applying ℓ2, ℓ3 and ℓ5, it is deduced for any i ∈ In :
(A∩Πn(i))×Γn(i) = (B∩Πn(i))×Γn(i) and (A∩Γn(i))×Πn(i) = (B∩Γn(i))×Πn(i) .
Finally A ∩Πn(i) = B ∩ Πn(i) and A ∩ Γn(i) = B ∩ Γn(i) for any i ∈ In , and:
A ∩
⋃
i∈In
(Πn(i) ∪ Γn(i)) = B ∩
⋃
i∈In
(Πn(i) ∪ Γn(i)) .
A = B is deduced by applying the lemma.
Conclusion.
The previous results imply that µn is a one-to-one Boolean morphism.
D.4. Proof of α2
By definition, the result holds true for any A ∈ Mn \ {∅,Ωn, bn,∼ bn} . It is also true
for A = ∅ or A = Ωn , since fn+1(µn(B), µn(∅))= fn+1(µn(B), ∅)= µn(B) = µn(fn(B, ∅))
and similarly fn+1(µn(B), µn(Ωn))= fn+1(µn(B),Ωn+1)= µn(B) = µn(fn(B,Ωn)) .
The true difficulties come from the cases A = bn or A =∼ bn .
Subsequently, it is assumed A = bn ; the case A =∼ bn is quite similar.
It comes:
fn+1(µn(B), µn(bn)) = (id ∪ T )
(
µn(B) ∩
(⋃
i∈In
(Πn(i)× Γn(i))
))
= (id ∪ T )
(⋃
i∈In
(B ∩Πn(i))× Γn(i)
)
.
The existence of fn(B, bn) implies the case 0 , and there is C ∈Mν+1 such that B = C[n .
By recursion hypotheses α1, it comes:
B ∩ ω[n = (C ∩ ω)[n = ω[n if ω ∈ C , = ∅ if ω 6∈ C .
By recursion hypotheses β6 (i.e. by β2 and β4), it comes:
fn(ω[n, bn) ∩ fn(B, bn) = fn(ω[n ∩B, bn) = fn(ω[n, bn) if ω ∈ C , = ∅ if ω 6∈ C .
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As a consequence
⋃
i∈In
(B ∩ Πn(i))× Γn(i) =
⋃
i∈In
Πn(i)× (fn(B, bn) ∩ Γn(i)) .
By β3, B ∩ω[n = B ∩ bn ∩ω[n = fn(B, bn)∩ bn ∩ω[n = fn(B, bn)∩ω[n for any ω ∈ µν(bν) .
As a consequence
⋃
i∈In
(B ∩ Πn(i))× Γn(i) =
⋃
i∈In
(fn(B, bn) ∩ Πn(i))× Γn(i) .
By applying the both results, it comes:
fn+1(µn(B), µn(bn)) =
(⋃
i∈In
(fn(B, bn)∩Πn(i))×Γn(i)
)
∪
(⋃
i∈In
(fn(B, bn)∩Γn(i))×Πn(i)
)
.
And by definition of µn, it is finally deduced fn+1(µn(B), µn(bn)) = µn(fn(B, bn)) .
D.5. Proof of β1
For A 6∈ {µn(bn),∼ µn(bn), ∅,Ωn+1}, the propriety is inherited from n by applying α2 .
The property is also obvious for A ∈ {∅,Ωn+1} .
The difficulty comes from A = µn(bn) or A =∼ µn(bn) ; then notice that A 6= ∅ by
construction.
It is now hypothesized A = µn(bn) ⊂ B ; the case A =∼ µn(bn) is quite similar.
Then T (µn(bn)) ⊂ T (B) and by lemma, corollary 1&2:
fn+1(B, µn(bn)) = (B ∩ µn(bn)) ∪ (T (B)∩ ∼ µn(bn)) = µn(bn)∪ ∼ µn(bn) = Ωn+1 .
D.6. Proof of β2
For A 6∈ {µn(bn),∼ µn(bn), ∅,Ωn+1}, the propriety is inherited from n by applying α2 .
The property is also obvious for A ∈ {∅,Ωn+1} .
The property is immediate for A ∈ {µn(bn),∼ µn(bn)} , since T (B1∪B2) = T (B1)∪T (B2).
D.7. Proof of β3
For A 6∈ {µn(bn),∼ µn(bn), ∅,Ωn+1}, the propriety is inherited from n by applying α2 .
The property is also obvious for A ∈ {∅,Ωn+1} .
The difficulty comes from A ∈ {µn(bn),∼ µn(bn)}.
It is now hypothesized A = µn(bn) ; the case A =∼ µn(bn) is quite similar.
The result is immediate from corollary 2 of lemma.
D.8. Proof of β4
For A 6∈ {µn(bn),∼ µn(bn), ∅,Ωn+1}, the propriety is inherited from n by applying α2 .
The property is also obvious for A ∈ {∅,Ωn+1} .
The difficulty comes from A ∈ {µn(bn),∼ µn(bn)} .
It is now hypothesized A = µn(bn) ; the case A =∼ µn(bn) is quite similar.
By corollary 2 of lemma, fn+1(∼ B, µn(bn)) = (µn(bn) \B) ∪ (∼ µn(bn) \ T (B)) .
By ℓ6, fn+1(∼ B, µn(bn)) =∼
(
(B ∩ µn(bn)) ∪ (T (B)∩ ∼ µn(bn))
)
=∼ fn+1(B, µn(bn)) .
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D.9. Lemma 2.
Let C ∈ Bn+1 . Then:
fn+1
(
fn+1(C, µn(bn)), µn(bn)
)
= fn+1
(
fn+1(C, µn(bn)),∼ µn(bn)
)
= fn+1(C, µn(bn))
and
fn+1
(
fn+1(C,∼ µn(bn)), µn(bn)
)
= fn+1
(
fn+1(C,∼ µn(bn)),∼ µn(bn)
)
= fn+1(C,∼ µn(bn)) .
Proof. The result is derived for fn+1(C, µn(bn)) ; it is quite similar for fn+1(C,∼ µn(bn)) .
By corollary 2 of lemma, fn+1(C, µn(bn)) = (C ∩ µn(bn)) ∪ (T (C)∩ ∼ µn(bn)) .
Since T (fn+1(C, µn(bn))) = fn+1(C, µn(bn)) by definition, the proof is achieved by
applying corollary 2.
✷✷✷
Corollary. As a direct consequence, fn+1(fn+1(B,A), A) = fn+1(fn+1(B,A),∼ A) =
fn+1(B,A) , whenever fn+1(B,A) exists.
D.10. Proof of β5w
Assume fn+1(B,A) and fn+1(B,∼ A) exist and fn+1(B,A) = B .
By corollary of lemma 2, fn+1(B,∼ A) = fn+1(fn+1(B,A),∼ A) = fn+1(B,A) = B .
E. Proof: completeness for the conditional operator
It is defined h : Θ→ B[Θ] by h(θ) = ν0(ξθ), where ξθ = {(δτ )τ∈Θ ∈ Ω0 / δθ = 1} .
To be proved the equivalence of the assertions:
1. ⊢ φ in DBL∗ ,
2. h(φ) = Ω ,
3. |=M[Θ] φ .
Notice that 1 implies 3 and 3 implies 2 . As a consequence, it is sufficient to prove:
h(φ) = Ω implies ⊢ φ in DBL∗ . (23)
Let L≡ be the factor set of L by the logical equivalence ≡ of DBL∗.
Define h≡ : L≡ → B[Θ] by:
h≡(φ≡) = (h(φ))≡ for any φ ∈ L .
Then, proposition (23) is a corollary of:
h≡ is a Boolean isomorphism from L≡ to B[Θ] , (24)
which will be derived from a recursive construction of L similar to the definition of B[Θ] .
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Construction.
Assume the sequence (Bn,∪,∩,∼, ∅,Ωn, fn, µn, bn)n∈IN being constructed.
The sequence (Ln)n∈IN is defined by:
• L0 = LC ,
• Ln+1 ⊂ L is the set generated by Ln, the classical operators, the conditionals (·|φ)
and (·|¬φ) where φ is any proposition of Ln such that h(φ) = νn(bn) .
A set Σn ⊂ (Ln)≡ is called a generating partition of (Ln)≡, if it verifies:
∀φ ∈ (Ln)≡ , ∃S ⊂ Σn ,
∨
σ∈S
σ = φ and σ∧σ′ = ⊥ for any σ, σ′ ∈ Σn such that σ 6= σ
′ .
The following property is proved recursively in the next paragraphs:
There is a generating partition Σn of (Ln)≡ such that card(Σn) ≤ card(Ωn) . (25)
Since h≡ is by construction an onto morphism from (Ln)≡ to νn(Bn) , (25) implies that
h≡ is a Boolean isomorphism from (Ln)≡ to νn(Bn) .
The definition of bn implies the condition (19) of the direct limit for Bn. Then, for any
n ∈ IN, also exists m > n such that (ψ|φ) ∈ Lm for any φ, ψ ∈ Ln .
As a consequence, L≡ = ∪n∈IN(Ln)≡ and (25) implies (24).
E.1. Recursive proof of (25)
True for n = 0.
Obvious, since B0 is isomorph to the factor set of LC by ≡C , and ≡C is weaker than ≡.
True for n implies true for n+ 1.
The recursion hypothesis implies that h≡ is an isomorphism from (Ln)≡ to νn(Bn) .
Then, define βn ∈ (Ln)≡ such that h≡(βn) = bn (notice that βn 6= ⊥ and ¬βn 6= ⊥).
It is known, from 3.1.9 and 3.1.10, that:
((·|βn)|¬βn) = ((·|βn)|βn) = (·|βn) and ((·|¬βn)|βn) = ((·|¬βn)|¬βn) = (·|¬βn) .
Then, by applying 3.1.5, it comes that (Ln+1)≡ is generated by:
Σn+1 = {σ ∧ (σ
′|βn) ∧ (σ
′′|¬βn) / σ, σ
′, σ′′ ∈ Σn} \ {⊥} .
Now, denote Bn = {σ ∈ Σn /σ ∧ βn = σ} and Bn = {σ ∈ Σn / σ ∧ ¬βn = σ} .
It comes from b1 and 3.1.5, that (σ′|βn) = (σ
′′|¬βn) = ⊥ for σ
′ ∈ Bn and σ
′′ ∈ Bn .
Moreover, from 3.1.7, σ ∧ (σ′|βn) ∧ (σ
′′|¬βn) = ⊥ for σ 6∈ {σ
′, σ′′} ; on the other hand,
σ ∧ (σ|βn) = σ for σ ∈ Bn , and σ ∧ (σ|¬βn) = σ for σ ∈ Bn .
Then, the two construction cases of (Bn,∪,∩,∼, ∅,Ωn, fn, µn, bn)n∈IN are considered:
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Case 1.
Σn+1 =
⋃
σ∈Bn
⋃
σ′∈Bn
{σ ∧ (σ′|¬βn), σ
′ ∧ (σ|βn)} , owing to the above discussion.
As a consequence, card(Σn+1) ≤ 2card(Bn)card(Bn) = 2card(bn)card(∼ bn) = card(Ωn+1) .
Case 0.
In this case, βn = βν .
Define Cν = {σ ∈ Σν+1/σ ∧ βν = σ} and Cν = {σ ∈ Σν+1/σ ∧ ¬βν = σ} .
Define also D[φ] = {σ ∈ Σn/σ ∧ φ = σ} for any φ ∈ (Lν+1)≡ .
From previously, it is know that Σn+1 contains elements of the form σ ∧ (σ
′|¬βn) or
σ′ ∧ (σ|βn) with (σ, σ
′) ∈ Bn ×Bn ; but the construction at step ν + 1 implies additional
constraints, to be specified.
Let consider the case σ∧(σ′|¬βn) with (σ, σ
′) ∈ Bn×Bn ; case σ
′∧(σ|βn) is quite similar.
Notice that there is (τ, τ ′) ∈ Cν×Cν such that σ ∈ D[τ ]∩D[(τ
′|¬βν)] , and (θ, θ
′) ∈ Cν×Cν
such that σ′ ∈ D[θ] ∩D[(θ′|βν)] .
Now, τ ∧ (τ ′|¬βν) ∧ (θ ∧ (θ
′|βν)|¬βν) = (τ ∧ (θ
′|βν)) ∧ (τ
′ ∧ θ|¬βν) = ⊥ unless τ = θ
′ and
τ ′ = θ .
As a consequence, it is deduced:
σ∧(σ′|¬βn) 6= ⊥ implies ∃(τ, θ) ∈ Cν×Cν , (σ, σ
′) ∈ (D[τ ]∩D[(θ|¬βν)])×(D[θ]∩D[(τ |βν)]) .
Similarly, it is deduced:
σ′∧(σ|βn) 6= ⊥ implies ∃(θ, τ) ∈ Cν×Cν , (σ
′, σ) ∈ (D[θ]∩D[(τ |βν)])×(D[τ ]∩D[(θ|¬βν)]) .
At last card(Σn+1) ≤
∑
(τ,θ)∈Cν×Cν
2 card(D[τ ] ∩D[(θ|¬βν)])card(D[θ] ∩D[(τ |βν)])
=
∑
i∈In
2 card(Πn(i))card(Γn(i)) = card(Ωn+1) .
F. Probability extension
To be proved:
Let π be a probability defined over C , such that π(φ) > 0 for any φ 6≡C ⊥. Then, there
is a (multiplicative) probability π defined over DBL∗ such that ∀φ ∈ LC , π(φ) = π(φ) .
The construction of π is based on the recursive definition of (Bn,∪,∩,∼, ∅,Ωn, fn, bn, µn)n∈IN .
F.1. Construction
For any n ∈ IN, the probability Pn is defined over Bn by:
Pn(A) =
∑
ω∈A
Pn(ω) for any A ∈ Bn ,
and:
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Initialization.
For ω = (δθ)θ∈Θ ∈ Ω0 and τ ∈ Θ, define:
τω = τ if δτ = 1 and τω = ¬τ if δτ = 0 . (26)
Then set P0(ω) = π
(∧
τ∈Θ τω
)
for any ω ∈ Ω0 .
From n to n+1.
For any (ω, ω′) ∈ Πn(i)× Γn(i) , set:
Pn+1(ω, ω
′) =
Pn(ω)Pn(ω
′)
Pn(Γn(i))
and Pn+1(ω
′, ω) =
Pn(ω)Pn(ω
′)
Pn(Πn(i))
.
In particular, Pn+1(T (ω)) = Pn+1(ω)
Pn(Γn(i))
Pn(Πn(i))
for ω ∈
⋃
i∈In
(Πn(i)× Γn(i)) .
F.2. Lemmas.
F.2.1. Lemma 1
Pn+1(A[n+1) = Pn(A) for any A ∈ Bn .
Proof. For A ∈ Bn , µn(A) =
⋃
i∈In
((
(A∩Πn(i))×Γn(i)
)
∪
(
(A∩Γn(i))×Πn(i)
))
and
then:
Pn+1(µn(A)) =
∑
i∈In
 ∑
ω∈A∩Πn(i)
 ∑
ω′∈Γn(i)
Pn(ω)Pn(ω
′)
Pn(Γn(i))
 + ∑
ω∈A∩Γn(i)
 ∑
ω′∈Πn(i)
Pn(ω)Pn(ω
′)
Pn(Πn(i))

=
∑
i∈In
 ∑
ω∈A∩Πn(i)
Pn(ω) +
∑
ω∈A∩Γn(i)
Pn(ω)
 =∑
ω∈A
Pn(ω) = Pn(A) .
✷✷✷
Corollary. Pn(Ωn) = 1 .
Derived from P0(Ω0) = π(⊤) = 1 which is obvious.
Corollary of the corollary. Pn is indeed a probability in the classical meaning.
Additivity, coherence are obtained by construction. Finiteness comes from the corollary.
F.2.2. Lemma 2
1. Pn(Πn(i)) + Pn(Γn(i)) =
Pn(Πn(i))
Pn(bn)
=
Pn(Γn(i))
Pn(∼ bn)
, for any i ∈ In ,
2. Pn+1(µn(bn) ∩ A) = Pn+1(µn(bn))Pn+1
(
fn+1(A, µn(bn))
)
, for any A ∈ Bn+1 ,
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3. Pn+1(∼ µn(bn)∩A) = Pn+1(∼ µn(bn))Pn+1
(
fn+1(A,∼ µn(bn))
)
, for any A ∈ Bn+1 .
These propositions are proved recursively.
Proof of 1. Obvious in case 1; the difficulty arises for case 0.
Assume now case 0, and let (ω, ω′) ∈ In , i.e. ω ∈ µν(bν) and ω
′ ∈∼ µν(bν).
Since µν(bν) ∩ ω = ω, the recursion hypothesis over 2 yields:
Pν+1
(
fν+1(ω
′,∼ µν(bν)) ∩ ω
)
= Pν+1(µν(bν))Pν+1
(
fν+1
(
fν+1(ω
′,∼ µν(bν)) ∩ ω, µν(bν)
))
.
Finally Pn(Πn(i)) = Pn(bn)Pν+1
(
fν+1(ω
′,∼ µν(bν)) ∩ fν+1(ω, µν(bν))
)
.
Similarly, Pn(Γn(i)) = Pn(∼ bn)Pν+1
(
fν+1(ω
′,∼ µν(bν)) ∩ fν+1(ω, µν(bν))
)
.
Then
Pn(Πn(i))
Pn(bn)
=
Pn(Γn(i))
Pn(∼bn)
and the result is deduced from Pn(bn) + Pn(∼ bn) = 1.
Proof of 2. Since Pn+1(T (ω)) = Pn+1(ω)
Pn(Γn(i))
Pn(Πn(i))
for ω ∈
⋃
i∈In
(Πn(i)× Γn(i)) , it comes:
Pn+1
(
fn+1(A, µn(bn))
)
=
∑
i∈In
( ∑
ω∈A∩(Πn(i)×Γn(i))
Pn+1(ω)
Pn(Πn(i)) + Pn(Γn(i))
Pn(Πn(i))
)
=
∑
i∈In
∑
ω∈A∩(Πn(i)×Γn(i))
Pn+1(ω)
Pn(bn)
=
∑
i∈In
Pn+1
(
A ∩ (Πn(i)× Γn(i))
)
Pn(bn)
=
Pn+1(µn(bn) ∩ A)
Pn+1(µn(bn))
,
by using 1.
Proof of 3. Similar to 2.
✷✷✷
F.2.3. Conclusion.
Lemma 1 make possible the definition of P∞ : B[Θ]→ IR
+ by:
P∞(νn(A)) = Pn(A) , for any n ∈ IN and A ∈ Bn . (27)
Beside, P∞ is entirely defined then, since B[Θ] =
⋃
n∈IN νn(Bn) .
By inheritance from the probabilities Pn and lemma 2, P∞ verifies for any A,B ∈ B[Θ] :
P∞(∅) = 0 and P∞(Ω) = 1 ,
P∞(A) + P∞(B) = P∞(A ∩ B) + P∞(A ∪ B) , for any A,B ∈ B[Θ]
P∞(A ∩B) = P∞(A)P∞(f∞(B,A)) , for any A,B ∈ B[Θ] .
 (28)
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Now, let us define the atomic assignment h : Θ→ B[Θ] by:
h(θ) = ν0(ξθ) , where ξθ = {(δτ )τ∈Θ ∈ Ω0 / δθ = 1} .
It is noticed, that its extention over L, denoted h, verifies:
h
(∧
τ∈Θ
τω
)
= ν0(ω) for any ω ∈ Ω0 , (29)
where τω is defined in (26).
Then, define π for any φ ∈ L by:
π(φ) = P∞(h(φ)) . (30)
By property (29) and the definition of P0, it comes:
π(φ) = π(φ) for any φ ∈ LC .
Now, from property (28), it comes that π is a multiplicative probability over L.
Rational structure of π .
Let Σ =
{∧
θ∈Θ ǫθ
/
ǫ ∈
∏
θ∈Θ{θ,¬θ}
}
. For any φ ∈ L , there is a rational function
Rφ : IR
Σ → IR such that π(φ) = Rφ(π(σ)|σ∈Σ) .
The proof is obvious from the construction.
